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This thesis analyzes the conunercial development of West
Africa's petroleum resources and examines the implications
of sudden "oil wealth" for the region's political and economic
development. Section one outlines the evolution of the
petroleum industry and surveys the hydrocarbon potential of
twenty nations along the coast from Senegal to Angola, and
inland from Mali to the Central African Republic. An evalu-
ation of the physical and political constraints on the
development of the region's petroleum resources and an
aggregate analysis of the area's potential for new oil reserves
and production capacity are also presented. Finally, by
drawing from the experiences of established oil producers
like Nigeria, the economic and political implications of the
widespread development of petroleum resources in West Africa
are projected at the domestic and regional levels. Specifi-
cally, will newfound oil wealth help resolve existing problems,
or will it magnify them? The study concludes that for most
of these countries, oil wealth will be a mixed blessing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1950s, petroleum became the x>^orld's dominant
source of commercial energy, and in the ensuing twenty years
it was universally embraced as the fuel with almost ideal
characteristics — it was convenient, abundant and inexpensive.
However, in 19 73 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) abruptly and permanently ended the era of
inexpensive petroleum, and in the process set off a series of
international economic Shockwaves that have reverberated for
almost a decade. The OPEC action also fostered a series of
debates concerning the abundance of the world's petroleum
supplies. These debates have become increasingly relevant
as industrialization and modernization have forced many
developing countries to compete with the developed countries
for scarce international energy resources. It has now become
evident that current world petroleum reserves will not be
sufficient to satisfy the growing worldwide energy demands
indefinitely.
Due to the sharp increase in petroleum prices since the
1973 OPEC oil embargo and the continuing political instability
in the Middle East, the free world's industrialized oil-
importing countries have become increasingly anxious to
diversify their petroleum supply lines away from the troubled
Arabian Gulf. As a result, many major U.S. and European oil
13

companies have mounted massive petroleum exploration
campaigns into hostile frontier regions that were once
considered to be unfeasible for commercial exploitation. One
such area is West and Central Africa. Major new discoveries
in the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Congo, and Angola have touched
off a feverish search for petroleum reserves all along West
Africa's coast, as well as in some of West and Central
Africa's more remote interior regions.
Only a few years ago the potential of Sub-Saharan Africa
as a significant source of crude oil was judged to be poor.
For example, it took the entire continent of Africa from 1911
until 1963 to produce its first billion barrels of oil;
however since 1956, the West African region alone has
produced over ten billion barrels of crude oil. [Ref. 1:
p. 20 2] Now there appears to be significant petroleum deposits
all along the West African littoral, and currently drilling
activity is underway or planned in virtually every coastal
nation from Senegal to Angola and inland from Mali to Zaire
(see Figure 1) . Based on the high level of activity and
the massive investments being made to under-v>7rite the
exploration and development of West Africa's petroleum
reserves, it appears that the region has moved into third
place, behind North America and the Middle East, in the geo-

















Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: exploratory activity in 1980.
Reprinted by permission of the American Association
of American Geologists. [Ref. 2: o. 2085]
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Although no one expects another Nigeria, some petroleum
experts are predicting that the boom area for the oil
industry in the coming decade will be West Africa. By world
standards, the recent discoveries are not large; nevertheless
even modest production levels could have the potential to
dramatically alter the region's economic and political
structures and relationships. Small scale exports of petroleum
products could allow some of these countries to re-establish
favorable balances of trade, off-setting the disastrous drain
placed on their developing economies by rising international
oil prices and high interest rates. Even without new dis-
coveries — which seems unlikely, given the present levels
of exploration — non-OPEC West African nations could be
exporting, according to most estimates, 500,000 b/d or more
sometime in the mid-19 80s. [Ref. 3: p. 1] Several West
African nations also possess the potential to export significant
amounts of natural gas; however the region's natural gas
reserves, even more than its oil reserves, are dependent upon
rising natural gas prices and the emergence of new markets
to make their development economically feasible.
Some Africanists regard the exploitation of West Africa's
oil resources as the ushering in of a "Brave New World."
They argue that it is a second chance for these countries to
achieve political and economic independence, to achieve
domestic and regional stability, and to achieve true national
development with a higher standard of living for all. There
16

are others who argue that under the bravest of new worlds
nothing will change. They question whether any amount of
oil wealth would be sufficient to overcome the forces at work
in most African countries that make political and economic
development problematic at best; instead, they maintain that
oil revenues will tend to exacerbate existing problems, both
domestically and regionally.
Regardless of where the truth lies, to properly analyze
the political and economic implications of the development
of West Africa's petroleum resources, the region's true
petroleum potential must be determined. Chapter Two of this
study surveys the petroleum potential of West Africa's eight
established petroleum producing countries: Angola, Cameroon,
Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Zaire; Chapter
Three surveys the potential of three countries in the region
who are attempting to emerge as petroleum producers:
Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, and Togo-Benin; and Chapter Four
evaluates eight West African countries which are believed to
possess some potential for petroleum production: Chad, Niger,
Central African Republic, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone. Each of the twenty countries is treated
seperately beginning with a short summary of the country's
current petroleum exploration, development, and production
activity, its proved reserves are presented and its potential
17

for new reserves and future production capacity are estimated.*
Chapter Five evaluates the physical and political constraints
upon the development of the region's petroleum resources;
and Chapter Six provides an aggregate analysis of the area's
potential for new reserves and production capacity.
Finally, Chapters Seven and Eight analyze some of the
economic and political implications posed by the development
of West Africa's hydrocarbon resources. Specifically, the
chapter addresses the following four questions: Will the
development of oil production throughout West Africa effectively
help resolve the domestic problems of hunger, unemployment,
health, and education? Will it promote regional stability?
Will it lead to greater political and economic independence?
Or will it continue to be — as in most oil producing
countries — a "profit pump" capable, in a short lapse of
time, of exhausting the region's oil reserves without solving
the burning questions for the people of this region?
J.
Since decisions to expand production capacity are made
on the basis of estimates of future demand and prices for
petroleum products, projections of production increases are
speculative and subject to change. The reader must bear in
mind that the estimates contained in this monograph are
contingent upon favorable international market conditions,
and that current development targets will be achieved.
13

II. ESTABLISHED PETROLEUM PRODUCING COUNTRIES
A, ANGOLA-CABINDA
1. General
Commercial quantities of oil were first discovered
in Portuguese Angola in 1955. [Ref. 4: p. 2] In 1960, Gulf
Oil Corporation began seismic surveys which led to drilling
and development work in the Cabinda enclave. By 196 8, Angola's
production amounted to an average of 30,000 b/d from 113 wells;
output increased to 125,000 b/d in 19 72, and peaked at
150,000 b/d in 1974. [Ref. 5: p. 5] Portuguese withdrawal,
following independence, left wide gaps in technical and
commercial skills, while the continuing civil war exacerbated
the country's economic problems. In December 19 75, Gulf
suspended production for security reasons, but by April 19 76,
the Marxist MPLA government reached an agreement with Gulf to
resume operations. Crude oil production in Angola has not
averaged less than 100,000 b/d since 1974, in spite of the
country's almost continuous state of turmoil, and today,
petroleum exports account for almost 80 percent of the
country's foreign exchange earnings. [Ref. 4: pp. 1-7; 6:
p. 36]
The state oil company, Sociedade Angolana de
Combustiveis (SONANGOL) , founded in 1976, holds the key to
exploration and production in Angola. In 19 78, the government
19

published a petroleum law which gave SONANGOL ultimate control
over petroleum exploration and exploitation. Since the 1978 law,
discoveries are the property of the state, and concessions
are a thing of the past. Clearly, this means that foreign
oil companies must be in partnership with the Angolan govern-
ment, limited by law to two types of agreements: either the
joint venture type, in which the Angolan government holds a
minimum of 51 percent of the shares (compared to 16.67 percent
in 1976); or agreements covering the sharing of production,
in which the government's percentage varies, based on a
distribution of 6 percent (minimum) for the government and
40 percent for the foreign company. [Ref. 7: p. 2461]
Presently, the Angolans recognize the need for
Western expertise and direct investment in their development
effort and have tried to smooth the way for foreign interests.
However, the Angolans are working to develop SONANGOL into a
fully-fledged exploration, production, and international
petroleum marketing company. [Ref. 8: p. 54-55] In addition,
Angola, which has so far chosen not to join OPEC, has attem.pted
to persuade Gabon and Nigeria to join with it in forming a
West African Oil Producer's Association. [Ref. 9: p. 11]
Thus, the situation for foreign investors could be modified
if Angola acquires the ability to sustain independent operations
2. Production and Exploration
With 190 producing wells, Angola's crude oil
production dropped from 160,000 b/d in 19 30 to 140,000 b/d
20

in 19 31. According to the Director-General of SONANGOL, the
production slump was due to "technical operating problems,"
however, he predicted an average production rate of 200,000
b/d in 19 82, which would place Angola in fifth place among
African producers, behind Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt.
[Ref. 10: p. 7; p. 2461] Approximately two-thirds of Angola's
crude oil production is from the Gulf Oil offshore holdings
in Cabinda (see Figure 2); most of the remainder is produced
onshore in Angola proper. The specific breakdown of production
rates by area is shown in Table One.
Table 1




















[Ref. 11: p. 1]
As of July 1931, the Oil and Gas Journal reported
only three companies with commercial crude oil production in
Angola: PETROFINA (Belgium) with 43,009 b/d. Gulf Oil with
86,410 b/d, and Texaco with 2,239 b/d. [Ref. 12: pp. 99-100]
In the past Gulf Oil has been predominant in production








ii'3oe 12 30 ANGOLA
Figure 2. Angola-Cabinda and Republic of Zaire: concessions
and key wells. Reprinted by permission of the
American Association of Petroleum Geologists.
[Ref. 2: p. 2090]
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blocks in northern and central offshore waters to a host
of concerns. As of September 19 81, seventeen companies had
signed, or were about to sign exploration/production agree-
ments with SONANGOL. [Ref. 8: pp. 54-55]
Angola has divided its offshore acreage into 14
blocks, numbered consecutively from north to south (see
Figures 3 and 4). Currently there is significant activity
in seven of the blocks, as well as in the two onshore areas
in the Congo and Kwanza Basins. Investor interest in the
remaining blocks for oil exploration is strong. In January
1982, there were eight drilling rigs exploring Angolan waters,
a 50 percent increase over the previous year. [Ref. 13:
p. 178] Industry sources maintain that two to three times
as many rigs could be employed in West Africa if they were
available. For example. Gulf Oil drilled eleven exploratory
wells in 1981, and initiated a $1.2 billion five-year devel-
opment program that could boost their Cabinda production to
200,000 b/d by year-end 19 85. The program calls for drilling
a total of 185 wells, installation of a $16 8 million natural
gas reinjection system, and the launching of an enhanced
recovery program. [Ref. 5: pp. 42-4 3] Although the Gulf oil
operation is by far the largest in Angola, Gulf's competitors








Figure 3. Northern Angola: concessions and key wells.
Reprinted by permission of the American Association
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Fiaure 4 Southern Angola: concessions and key wells.
.
Reprinted by oermission of the American Association
of Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2: p. 2089]
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3. Reserves and Potential
Angola's hydrocarbon reserves lie in five sedimentary
basins that are either totally or partially located within
Angolan territorial boundaries. The Congo Basin is predomi-
nantly offshore and runs parallel to the coast from southern
Gabon to just north of Luanda. In addition to having Angola's
largest proved reserves of crude oil and natural gas, the
eastern edge of the basin has a tar belt estimated to contain
several billion barrels of hydrocarbon reserves. The Cuanza
Basin occupies the central one-third of Angola's coastline
and has some minor established production onshore. Owing to
its many geological similarities with the Congo Basin, this
basin is thought to have good future potential, particularly
in its largely unexplored offshore regions. [Ref. 11:
pp. 1-18]
The Mocamedes Basin lies south of the Cuanza Basin,
extending along Angola's shoreline into Namibia's territorial
waters. This basin is almost totally unexplored, but based
on its geological similarities with the basins to the north
it is thought to have definite hydrocarbon potential, and
several firms are negotiating for exploration rights. The
remaining two basins are the Congo Fan which lies offshore
adjacent to the western boundaries of the Congo and Cuanza
basins., and the Sstosha Basin which occupies southwest Angola
and parts of Zaire and Namibia. Both basins are relatively
unexplored and their potential is unknown. [Ref. 11: p. 1-18]
26

Angola has estimated proved reserves of 1.45 billion
bbl of crude oil and 1.03 trillion cu. ft. of natural gas.
[Ref. 12: 87] While offshore reserves account for almost 70
percent of Angola's present production, sizeable onshore
reserves extend about halfway down the coastline. Even though
the Angolan government is conservative about reserve depletion,
it seems equally anxious to develop the country's petroleum
potential. Based on present trends, the current production
of 160,000 b/d is predicted to climb to 200,000 b/d in 1982,
and by 1985 reach a sustained level of 300,000 b/d, with a
maximum production capacity in excess of 400,000 b/d. [Ref.
14: p. 1147] Crude oil reserves are also expected to rise
to 1.85 billion bbl during the same period. [Ref. 11: p. 18]
B. CAMEROON
1. General
Cameroon became Africa's twelfth oil producer and a
member of the oil exporter's club when its Kole Marine field
went on stream in November 19 77 at a rate of 5,000 b/d.
[Ref. 9: p. 16] Elf Aquitaine pioneered Cameroon's oil
industry by exploring the swampy onshore area around Douala
from 1951 to 1959, where non- commercial shows of oil and gas
were found. Elf shifted its search to the offshore Rio del
Ray permit in 196 3 and found Cameroon's first field, Betika,
but it was the Kole field, discovered two years later, that
produced the first oil. [Ref. 15: pp. 54-55] Those two
27

finds triggered the discovery of a clutch of fields in the
same area that boosted Cameroon's production from almost zero
in 1977 to an estimated 56,767 b/d in 1980. During the 1979-80
fiscal year, Cameroon's oil exports increased by 92 percent
in volume, and 261 percent in value over the 19 7 8-79 period.
The oil revenues contributed directly to a six percent real
rate of growth for the nation's economy, and along with
agricultural products generated approximately 76 percent of
Cameroon's 1979-80 export earnings. [Ref. 16: p. 63; 17: p. 2]
Cameroon's 19 7 8 petroleum legislation provided the
legal framework for the formation of the state-owned oil
com.pany, Ste. Nationale des Hydrocarbures (SNH) , which was
established in 1980. Cameroon's nationalistic petroleum
policies are implemented under the auspices of SNH, and the
company is responsible for all negotiations with foreign oil
companies. [Ref. 15: p. 54] SNH has assumed principle control
of Cameroon's petroleum industry by taking a 50 percent
interest in all exploration permits, while its equity share
of production permits is 60 percent for the first 15 million
tons (100,000 b/d) of annual output, 65 percent of the next
15 million tons, and 70 percent of all production above 30
million tons. [Ref. 18: p. 44-45] Officials of major U.S.
oil companies with operations in Cameroon, who were inter-
viewed for this study, remarked that the Cameroonians drive
hard bargains, but they are straight- forward and businesslike
in their dealings. In the view of these officials the major
28

problem has been getting the Cameroonians to recognize that
the large sums expended by foreign oil firms in exploration
and development must be recovered after a field is brought
on stream to finance new operations.
Despite these problems, Cameroon is probably the
fastest growing West African oil area. Perhaps the best
barometer of the country's growth is the increase in interest
shown by non-oil-sector investors. Since 1978, the Chase
Manhattan Bank, First National Bank of Boston, and Banque de
Paris et des Pays-Bas have joined the four French-owned
foreign banks in Douala. Bank of America has applied for
permission to open an affiliate and Citibank has expressed
a desire to do likewise. [Ref. 3: p. 1]
2. Production and Exploration
Although Cameroon has been a net exporter of crude
oil since 1977, it was a net importer of refined petroleum
products until its first refinery began operating in 19 80.
[Ref. 15; p. 54] Almost all crude oil production comes from
offshore fields operated by Elf-Serepca of the Elf Aquitaine
group in partnership with Pecten Cameroon, a Shell affiliate.
Cameroon, with 81 wells producing, racked up a 48 percent
gain in 1981, pushing its production up to 87,000 b/d; and
the 19 81 finds, that will add Mobil and the French firm, CFP-
Tctal, to the producer ranks, makes future prospects even
brighter. [Ref. 9: p. 13; 12: p. 85] During the 19 31-32
oil glut, the pragmatic Cameroonians cut their oil export
29

prices rather than see production plummet, consequently,
production forecasts for 19 82 are in the 100,000 b/d range.
[Ref. 19: p. 26] In 19 81, there ^v/ere six producing oil fields;
production rates are shown below in Table 2.
Table 2
CAMEROON'S OIL PRODUCTION




Ekoundou North Center 16,146 18.92
Ekoundou South 9,340 10.94
Kole 12,171 14.26
Kombo North 4,485 5.25
Kombo South Center 33,951 39.77
85,364 100.00
*all fields are offshore
**b/d average first six months of 19 81.
[Ref. 12: d. 105]
Despite brisk exploration in 19 80, there were no
major oil discoveries. During 1980, Elf completed the
development phase of the Ekoundou Sud and Betika Sud fields;
Ekoundou Nord and Kombo Central fields are still in devel-
ment. In 19 81, development was completed on Kombo Nord and
work began on Ekoundou Central and Boa fields (see Fig. 5).
[Ref. 15: p. 55] However, a large discovery by a Mobil/Total
group made 19 80 a big year for natural gas. [Ref, 20: p. 19 4]
This was followed in 19 31 by an Elf find in the Edoundou field
and another large discovery by Gulf off Douala (see Fig. 5).
Both of these discoveries were outside established gas regions,
indicatina that Cameroon's natural gas deposits may be more
30

Figure 5. West Cameroon: concessions and key wells.
Reprinted by permission of the American Association
of Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2: p. 2095]
31

Figure 6. Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea: concessions and
key wells. Reprinted by permission of the American




extensive than originally supposed, [Ref. 9: pp. 16-17]
Exploration in 19 81 by Gulf, xMobil, Shell, Total, and Elf
boosted the active rig count from four to eight, and could
double Cameroon's production capacity by 19 85. [Ref. 21: p. 86]
3. Reserves and Potential
Cameroon has parts of three sedimentary basins with
known hydrocarbon potential. The majority of Cameroon's
current production has come from the Niger Delta Basin, which
has some onshore areas, but lies mostly offshore along the
northern one-third of the coastline. The remainder of
Cameroon's production comes from the Douala Basin, which
occupies the central regions. The other area with known
potential is the Chad Basin in northern Cameroon, around
Lake Chad. [Ref. 22: ?. 22-28] In 19 81, Elf took two
exploration permits covering 18,445 square kilometers in
this region, and has conducted geophysical and aeromagnetic
surveys. [Ref. 15: p. 56] Cameroon is located between OPEC
producers, Nigeria and Gabon, and shares the same sedimentary
basins from which they produce.
In 19 81, Cameroon more than tripled its oil reserves,
from 140 million bbl to 480 million bbl, and raised its
natural gas reserves from 13 billion cu. ft. to 4.6 trillion
cu. ft. — with new fields, both on and offshore. [Ref. 12:
p. 90] In addition, Mobil's Victoria discovery, near Elf's
northern fields, appears to have the potential to significantly
boost reserves again, and may produce as much as 100,000 b/d.
33

[Ref. 15: p. 57; 23: p. 18] It is estimated that Cameroon's
current reserves will last 25 years, and with the fields in
development coming on stream, production should reach 200,000
b/d in 1985. [Ref. 17: p. 9]
But Cameroon's future may lie with natural gas and
not oil. According to one report. Gulf's discovery off the
central coast may have raised gas reserves by 5.2 to 6.3
trillion cu. ft. [Ref. 23: p. 18] However, it was the 1979
discovery of major gas fields by a Mobil/Total consortium,
only 10 kilometers north of Kiribi, that swept natural gas
into the spotlight. The gas fields prompted the government
to begin feasibility studies for a liquid natural gas (LNG)
plant. [Ref. 3: p. 1] At present Mobil, CFP-Total, Gulf,
Shell, and Elf all have interests in significant gas dis-
coveries. The Mobil find alone is reported to have reserves
of well over one trillion cu. ft. , and Mobil and Total are
busy with three rigs exploring other promising prospects in
the region. [Ref. 15: p. 57]
For the past year, SNH and the foreign operating
companies have been trying to prove-up enough gas reserves
to justify the construction of a S4 billion LNG complex.
Elf has shown confidence in the project by converting six
of its exploration permits into gas production permits.
[Ref. 15: p. 56] Under one plan, it was estimated that by
1987 Cameroon could have been exporting 500 million cu. ft.
of LNG daily — enough to supply Maryland's needs for a year.

[Ref. 16: p. 55] The final decision for construction, which
was to come in the siommer of 1982, has been postponed pending
further studies to determine whether Cameroon's natural gas
reserves are large enough to justify the expense of even a
small LNG facility. [Ref. 17: p. 14]
C . CONGO
1. General
Prospecting for oil in the Congo dates back to 1957
when this country was still one of the four territories of
French Equatorial Africa. The French-owned Elf-Aquitaine
discovered the Pointe Indienne oil and gas field in the on-
shore coastal area, and by 1960, the newly independent People's
Republic of Congo was producing 1044 b/d of crude oil. [Ref.
9: p. 21] Pointe Indienne 's output, which had declined from
1423 b/d in 1965 to 281 b/d in 1971, was supplanted in 1972
by the newly discovered Emeraude offshore deposits, pushing
production up to 6,700 b/d. Since then, production has
slowly increased, reaching 66,472 b/d in 1980. [Ref. 24:
p. 2800] Elf and its subsidiary, Elf-Congo, were the Congo's
sole producers until Agip-Congo, subsidiary of Italy's state-
owned Agip, brought Emeraude on stream. Today, 9 9.7 percent
of the Congo's production is derived from activities offshore
in deep water, where a Getty-led consortium set a world deep
water drilling record in 1978 by drilling in 4,346 feet of
water. [Ref. 15: p. 65]
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The Congo currently ranks low in importance compared
with other African producers. Its 60,000 b/d of crude oil
produced in 1980 represented little more than 1.1 percent of
total African output. [Ref. 23: p. 17] Nonetheless,
petroleum has become the Congo's principle export, accounting
for 70 percent of the government's receipts in 19 80. The oil
revenues have reestablished the country's balance of trade,
which had shown a chronic deficit until 1973. [Ref. 24:
p. 2800]
The Congo has fostered a favorable investment climate
to encourage foreign oil companies to explore and exploit
the country's oil and natural gas resources. A major
attraction has been the 75 percent equity share that the
country's national oil company, Hydro-Congo, has allowed to
foreign developers. [Ref. 16: p. 58] Instead of taJcing a
share in each of the different operations, in 19 80, Hydro-
Congo took a 20 percent share of both Elf-Congo and Agip-
Congo. The Congo has not adopted OPEC tax and fiscal guide-
lines, nor ownership provisos; as a result. Elf and Agip
have made handsome profits, estimated at $4-$ 5 per barrel.
[Ref. 3: pp. 54-55]
However, the winds of change are blowing. Hydro-
Congo plans to increase its equity share in Elf-Congo and
Agip-Congo to 30 percent in 19 32. The current Congolese
hydrocarbon policy has two major objectives: to take gradual
control over the energy sector in order ultimately to achieve
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economic independence, and to trim excessive windfall profits
by having foreign oil companies plough more of their earnings
back into the Congolese economy. [Ref. 25: pp. 48-49] In a
recently concluded exploration agreement, Hydro-Congo took
a 50 percent share in a Cities Service-led consortium and
this seems to be the future pattern. [Ref. 9: p. 21] Despite
the Congolese government's official adoption of Marxism-
Leninism as its guiding philosophy, more and more bankers
and businessmen from Europe and the U.S. are now making the
trek to Brazzaville, Congo. [Ref. 3: p. 3]
2. Production and Exploration
Production at the Emeraude and Loango offshore fields,
in decline for several years, appears to have levelled off
in 1980 at 26,000 b/d, but in April 1980 the Congo's production
was boosted by 8,00 b/d when the Likouala offshore field
came on stream (see Fig. 7) . Elf-Congo spent some $400
million to work Likouala up to a 30,000 b/d capacity in 19 81,
and to lay the groundwork to bring the newly discovered Yanga
and Sendji fields on stream in 1981 and 1982. [Ref. 23:
p. 17] Overall Congolese production rose to 78,500 b/d in
1981, and the entry into production of Sendji should push
output to over 100,000 b/d in 1982. [Ref. 24: p. 2800] A
breakdown of production by field is shown in Table 3.
With 15 3 wells already on stream and 15 exploration
rigs jostling one another along a small coastline, production







Figure 7. Republic of Congo: concessions and key wells.
Reprinted by permission of the American
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[Ref. 12: p. 108]
region. Elf has maintained its leadership in the development
race through exploration and by enhancing existing production,
Onshore, where Elf began production through its almost
depleted Pointe Indienne field, the company is planning to
bring Mengo field into production. Elf also plans further
drilling on its deepwater permits, where drilling encountered
oil shows in 1979. Elf has been disappointed in Emeraude 's
production, where despite the large reserve, only eight per-
cent of the oil can be extracted by normal recovery methods.
[Ref. 24: p. 2800] To correct the problem. Elf is planning
to install a steam injection system which facilitates
extraction of the heavy 23.3 gravity crude. This will be
the first time for this operation to be attempted at sea.
[Ref. 25: pp. 48-49]
Several other companies have been attracted to the
Congo, and since 19 79, U.S. firms have begun to invest in

the search for oil, particularly in the Congo Basin. Cities
Service and Canadian Superior Oil have taken a 1,450 sq. km.
permit known as Marine Permit One. So far. Coastal Corp-
oration, Agri-Petco International, Ladd Petroleum, Exxon,
and Phillips have also taken acreages. [Ref. 15: p. 65]
3. Reserves and Potential
All of the Congo's oil fields are located in the
Pointe Noire-Grands Fonds field, which covers the southern
third of the country's coastal and offshore region. Parts
of three sedimentary basins lie within the Congo's territorial
confines: the Congo Basin runs the entire length of the
country's coastline and accounts for all current production
of gas and oil; the Congo Fan Basin lies offshore beyond the
western edge of the Congo Basin, and is largely unexplored;
the Zaire Basin runs along the country's eastern border, but
its potential is also unknown.
In 1981, the Congo added .5 billion bbl to its
proven oil reserves, and natural gas reserves were estimated
to be 2.5 trillion cu. ft. [Ref. 12: p. 85] However,
recovery of these reserves is difficult because of the
complexity of the area's geological formations, low pressure
reservoirs, deep water, and sluggishly flowing heavy crude.
[Ref. 25: p. 14] As a result, the expansion of Congolese
petroleum production is conditioned by the development of
better exploration, offshore drilling, and recovery technology.
Based on present production trends, favorable market conditions.
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and the advent of enhanced recovery techniques, such as Elf's
steam injection project, Congolese oil production could top
100,000 b/d in 1982 and reach 200,000 b/d by 1985. [Ref. 9:
p. 21]
Also, oil production could be joined soon by the
production of natural gas for export. Congo consumes all of
the 10 million cubic meters per year it now produces. [Ref.
9: p. 21] Following a new discovery of gas by Elf and Agip
offshore from Pointe Noire in 1981, Hydro-Congo formed a new
company, Gaz-Congo, to work with Elf and Agip to evaluate the
country's natural gas export potential. Hydro-Congo chose
Elf to manage the development of a liquid natural gas (LNG)
project. [Ref. 6: o. 37] If conclusions are positive and
market conditions permit, construction could begin on a
liquefaction plant with an annual capacity of six million
cubic meters. [Ref. 24: p. 2800]
D . GABON
1. General
France's Elf Aquitaine began petroleum exploration
in its colony of Gabon in the 1930*3. Early offshore success
in the Congo triggered similar activities in Gabonese waters,
and Gabon became a producer in 1957 following Elf's discov-
eries in the Port Gentil area. Gabon's production capacity
increased rapidly in the next tv/o decades, finally peaking
at 227,450 b/d in 1976. However, output has steadily
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declined since 1976, and was down to 178,6 31 b/d in 19 80 — a
drop of over 35 percent. [Ref. 9: pp. 27-28] Even with the
decline, Gabon was Africa's fifth largest producer in 19 80.
Elf-Gabon, of the Elf Aquitaine group, dominates
Gabon's oil industry with over 85 percent of the country's
total production; conversely, Gabon is the mainstay in the
French company's operations, accounting for approximately 50
percent of Elf's worldwide operations. [Ref. 27: p. 2408]
The U.S. affiliate, Shell-Gabon, produces the remainder of
Gabon's crude oil. Elf's offshore Grondin field, discovered
in 1973, is Gabon's largest and most prolific oil field. It
has produced more than any other Gabonese field, including
the large Gamba field discovered ten years earlier by Shell.
[Ref. 9: pp. 26-27]
Despite declining production rates, owing to rising
crude oil prices, Gabon's oil revenues were increasing until
1980. In 1980, Gabon relied on crude oil for 78 percent of
its exports, and the oil income generated 50 percent of that
year's total GDP. [Ref. 28: p. 4] However, the 19 81-82
recession in world crude oil demand caused Gabon's oil earnings
to decline, forcing a curtailment of ambitious development
projects.
Although Gabon has been a memj^er of OPEC since 19 75,
in the past its petroleum legislation had been among the mcst
liberal in the world, with company profits of around five
dollars a barrel. In addition, Gabon also granted Elf and
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Shell an 11.5 percent discount on official OPEC posted prices
in late 19 81 to provide incentive for continued exploration
and production development. [Ref. 8: p. 54-55] Gabon's
state oil company, Petrogab, was established in 19 79 and
designated as the agency responsible for the government's
interest in production. Petrogab has shown no interest in
independent operations, but it has taken a 25 percent equity
share in both Elf-Gabon and Shell-Gabon, and it has started
negotiations to increase its capital share in each company to
35-41 percent by the end of 1982. [Ref. 15: p. 58; 29:
p. 34-38] Additionally, Petrogab has replaced its system of
separate exploration and production permits, with Indonesian-
style production sharing contracts which have significantly
increased Gabon's share of the profits. For example, Gabon
will receive 74.5 percent of the production from Amoco 's new
well in the Inquessi Marine concession. [Ref. 30: p. 4]
Gabon also now requires the foreign oil companies to invest
ten percent of their net profits into other sectors of the
Gabonese economy such as agriculture. Oil companies are
talcing a "wait and see" attitude toward Gabon's new demands,
but they generally consider the Indonesian-style contracts
to be fair and to provide sufficient access to crude. [Ref.
15: p. 58]
2. Production and Exploration
As a result of concerted efforts by the foreign
operating companies, earlier predictions that Gabon's crude
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oil production would drop to 120,000 b/d in 19 81 did not
materialize. Both Elf and Shell, who had experienced a sharp
decline from their on and offshore fields, took steps to
upgrade the production capacity of their existing fields and
to accelerate the development of new fields. Elf, which has
19 fields in operation, has five to six rigs engaged in
development work alone. Elf's development activities included;
more development drilling to boost production at Anguille
field, accelerated development of the new Ayol field, the
production start up of two new onshore wells, development
and test of two more new wells, and completion of development
on the new Baudroie Nord field which should achieve 7,000 to
8,000 b/d (see Fig. 8 and 9). Development drilling by Shell
restored the production capacity of the Lucina Marine field,
and three wells discovered earlier by Gulf were brought on
stream at 3,150 b/d. [Ref. 15: pp. 58-59] In all, 27 off-
shore wells were drilled, of which 22 were development, seven
were wildcats, and only five were classified as "dusters,"
or dry holes. Productive as these efforts were, total well
count went from 252 to 250 and Gabon's 19 81 output still fell
16 percent to 149,970 b/d. [Ref. 20: p. 196] Although it
is not reflected in the annual totals, Table 4 shows that the
oil companies did abate the downward trend in Gabon's
production capacity, if not enhance it.
While Gabon does not produce natural gas for export,
2.5 billion cu. ft. were consumed domestically in 1980 and
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Figure 8. Gabon: concessions and key wells. Reprinted
by permission of the American Association of
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Figure 9. Gabon: Detail of concessions and key wells.
Reprinted by permission of the American Association




GABON: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 19 80 AND 19 81
1st 9
months Sept
1981 1981COMPANY 1980 1981**
Elf-Gabon 125,103 130,983
Shell-Gabon 23,956 28,100
Totals* 176,453 149,059 159,083 149,970
*b/d converted from tons at 7.24 b/t.
**projection
[Ref. 6: p. 64]
a significant amount associated with oil production was flared
owing to the lack of collecting and processing facilities.
The government recently initiated a prograiri to study the
feasibility of exploiting the gas for increased domestic use.
If the plan materializes it will have the added advantage of
exploiting closed wells no longer producing oil. [Ref. 9:
p. 27]
An extensive exploration campaign has been mounted
to enlarge Gabon's dwindling crude oil reserves. In 19 80, a
total of 26 companies participated in exploration in Gabon.
There were 20 exploratory drillings, for a total of 37,45 3
meters, and three of these yielded commercial discoveries.
[Ref. 31: p. 1601] Exploration emphasis is being placed on
inland onshore areas and the unexplored waters off the south
coast. The major thrust is by Elf, who is working two rigs
onshore and three units offshore. [Ref. 15: p. 59] Slf
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spent more than 30 billion francs in 19 80 and says it is
determined to keep its exploration efforts at a high level.
[Ref. 32: p. 3] The intensive exploration efforts are
beginning to pay-off; in 19 80, Elf discovered a field at
Moubena that is expected to produce 26,000 b/d; and Standard
Oil of Indiana's (AMOCO) wildcat, 35 miles southeast of Port
Gentil, struck what resident manager Trump calls "a beauty
of a find," actually a 2,100 b/d well that flowed twice as
much under test. [Ref. 9: p. 27; 16: p. 55] As of January
19 82, there were 15 active rigs in Gabon, three more than in
the previous year. [Ref. 13: p. 178]
3. Reserves and Potential
Gabon has parts or all of four sedimentary basins
within its territorial limits that have known oil or gas
potential. The Congo and Congo Fan Basins in Gabon's southern
offshore area were described in the discussion of Angola. The
Douala Basin in the northern offshore region was described
in the section on Cameroon. Currently, Gabon's production
comes from the Gabon Basin, which is actually a continuation
of the Douala and Congo Basins, and occupies both the on and
offshore central three-quarters of the Gabonese coastline.
Oil shows are present in almost every stratigraphic unit in
the basin and much of it remains to be explored.
Gabon's crude oil reserves fell slightly in 19 81 to
4 80 million bbl, while natural gas reserves gained modestly
to 490 billion cu. ft. [Ref. 12: p. 85] Gabon does not have
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the vast proved reserves of its West and North African
neighbors, and some experts believe that while recent finds
have postponed the day of reckoning to some extent, barring
new discoveries, time is running out and production will
decline gradually over the next decade to a negligible amount
in the 1990 's. They maintain that the best Gabon can hope
for, given current proved reserves, is to stabilize output
at between 160,000 and 180,000 b/d. [Ref. 15: p. 58]
On the optimistic side, other sources, which include
Gabon's Minister of Mines and Oil, claim that recent dis-
coveries have doubled Gabon's known oil reserves. It would
seem that with new fields like Baliste coming on stream with
recoverable reserves of 15 million bbl, the trend is
becoming more favorable. [Ref. 29: p. 3438; 20: p. 196] In
fact, there are two major factors that favor a resurgence of
Gabonese reserves: the country still has large unexplored
onshore and offshore areas with known oil and gas potential,
and the government's new interest in exploiting gas will
undoubtedly stimulate an increase in natural gas reserves.
This argument is both intuitively and empirically correct,
but it must overcome some difficult obstacles to become
manifest. Foremost, is that while promising structures have
been uncovered during recent explorations, because of the
complexity of Gabon's geological formations and its hostile
operating environment, development will necessitate large





Significant deposits of oil were first discovered
in Ghana in 1970 by a consortium called Agri-Petco of Ghana,
led by the U.S. based Signal Oil Group. The find, located
approximately eight miles offshore south of Saltpond, went
into production in 1978 with six wells producing around 5,000
b/d. Development of the small field was delayed because of
changing government policies and low crude oil prices.
[Ref. 33: p. 5345; 15: p. 65]
Political and economic instability have been major
constraints to oil development in Ghana, and the future seems
to promise more of the same. The government, which announced
that it would establish a state owned oil company by mid-19 82,
currently has the right to participate in petroleum production
and exploration by taking an interest of up to 20 percent.
[Ref. 34: p. 452] In 19 81, under the now deposed Limann
Administration, a ten member Petroleum Promotion Council was
inaugurated to coordinate and encourage exploration efforts
in the country. [Ref. 9: p. 29] The Administration's
Minister of Fuel and Power, Mr. F. Wulf-Tagoe, said his
Ministry would "... maintain a fair and favorable climate
for all companies operating in Ghana. " His chief concern
was for Ghana to achieve oil self-sufficiency to escape from
a $40 million per month oil import bill. [Ref. 35: p. 135]
However, the new Rawlings-led government has taken the
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petroleum legislation and policies of the Limann Administration
under advisement, and while the new government has not
announced its position on petroleum resources development,
the probability for change would seem to be moderately high.
In addition, since further political instability seems probable,
some U.S. petroleum analysts regard post-coup Ghana as po-
tentially the most hazardous country in West Africa for oil
company operations and for the physical safety of oil company
employees
.
2. Production and Exploration
Agri-Petco's operations at the Saltpond field have
been plagued with technical difficulties caused by rising
gas-oil ratios and three of the six wells were taken off
production in 1980 (see Fig. 10). Output has fallen to a
modest but steady 2,100 b/d -- making Ghana the smallest
producer in West Africa. [Ref. 15: p. 65]
The government announced in 19 81 that oil exploration
is to be extended to onshore and inland sites as well as some
lagoons. [Ref. 35: p. 135] The Phillips' discovery in the
Ivory Coast has renewed exploration interest in Ghana's
portion of the Ivory Coast-Ghana Basin, and the largest effort
in Ghana is being led by Phillips. The company, with an
interesting offshore oil and gas discovery near Half Hassini,
has spent $60 million and plans to spend another $10 million.
[Ref. 36: p. 3407] Texas Pacific has been exploring the





Figure 10. Ghana: concessions and key wells. Reprinted
by permission of the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2: p. 2112]
Dd

negotiating an exploration agreement. [Ref. 35: p. 135]
In 1980, only two wildcats were drilled, one was declared
oil producing and one gas producing. [Ref. 20: p. 19 3]
However, as of January 19 82, there were no active rigs
reported in Ghana. [Ref. 13: p. 178]
3. Reserves and Potential
Ghana has access to four major sedimentary basins:
The Ivory Coast-Ghana Basin is discussed under the Ivory
Coast, and the offshore Niger Cone Basin is thought to have
limited potential. The Dahomey Basin is part of the great
coastal basin which extends from the Ivory Coast to Nigeria.
It is largely unexplored, but is structurally similar to
the Ivory Coast-Ghana Basin and it has produced oil dis-
coveries. The inland Volta Basin, lying along Ghana's
eastern border, has had limited exploration; traces of oil
and gas have been found, indicating that the area has some
interesting prospects. [Ref. 22: pp. 14-15; 42-51] Ghana's
proved oil reserves stand at 6.3 million bbl, and although
gas is present, reserves have not been established. [Ref.
9: p. 29] Even with an extensive exploration campaign to
locate larger deposits, it appears that Ghana will have






Petroleum exploration started in the Ivory Coast in
19 71, and although several small finds were made in the mid-
1970 's, due to low crude oil prices, they weren't considered
commercially feasible. In 19 75, a group led by Esso Cote
d' Ivorie and Esso AG discovered the Grand Belier field in
the country's central offshore area. In 1978, Esso decided
to put the field on production and by 1981, with development
still in progress, output had reached 7,000 b/d. [Ref. 15:
pp. 65, 67; 12: p. 85] However, the most significant event
in Ivorian petroleum history occurred in 19 80 when a Phillips
Petroleum led group discovered what appears to be the first
field of giant size (over 500 million bbl) west of the Niger
Delta. [Ref. 15: p. 68] Neither Phillips, nor the Ivorian
government will talk about the field's reserves or potential
production rate, but other industry sources seem to thinlc
the find could boost the Ivory Coast into second place among
West African producers. [Ref. 6: p. 52]
According to a recent study by the Ivorian government,
the country will soon be self-sufficient in oil, and is well
on its way to becoming a net oil exporting country. [Ref. 37:
p. 2947] That is good news for a country facing a serious
financial crisis from a rapidly growing external debt. The
country is projected to become self-sufficient in 198 2, and
oil revenues should become a major foreign exchange earner
by mid-decade. [Ref. 38: p. 5]
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In 1975, the Ivory Coast followed the pattern set by
other oil producing states by forming the Societe D' Operations
Petrolieres De Cote D'lvoire (PETROCI) to act for the State
and public on all matters concerning oil and gas development.
By law, PETROCI can take up to a 60 percent equity share of
any petroleum concession in the country, and collect a 50
percent tax on net profits and royalties. Each concession
is negotiated and controlled separately through a series of
production-sharing contracts. When the contract for the
Grand Belier field was negotiated, the two Exxon subsidiaries
were given a 63.75 percent share, Shell Cote d'lvorie 21.25
percent, and PETROCI took the remaining 15 percent. PETROCI
took a more sophisticated approach when it negotiated the
contract for the Espoir concession. The nominal equity split
was Phillips 57.5 percent, Agip Africa Ltd. 22.5 percent,
Sedco of the Ivory Coast Inc. 10 percent, and PETROCI 10
percent; however, PETROCI reserved its option to increase its
interest as production rises, at the expense of the other
participants. [Ref. 15: pp. 67-63; 39: p. 7]
2. Production and Exploration
In an effort to turn a trickle of oil into a torrent,
development is underway at a furious pace in the Ivory Coast.
With nine wells producing, Esso's Grand Belier field increased
its output by 600 percent in its first two years of production
and was eiroected to reach 20,000 b/d in 1933 (see Fig. 11).
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Figure 11. Ivory Coast: concessions and key wells.
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production problems and the Esso-Shell group is installing
a gas and water injection system to boost output. [Ref. 16:
p. 56] Esso now believes that peak output will be around
11,000 b/d — 36.6 percent of Ivorian domestic petroleum
consumption. [Ref. 40: p. 21]
Phillips completed its first Espoir field producer
in December 1980, at a flow rate of 6,335 b/d oil and 2.3
million cfd gas; five other wells had been drilled as of
December 1981, four found gas and/or oil. [Ref. 41: p. 34]
The group is running four rigs, contracted for five more,
and Phillips has ordered equipment for extended Espoir pro-
duction. Development plans call for drilling 30 more wells
at a cost of $12 million each, but with water depths of up
to 2,400 feet and a steeply inclined seabed, the field will
require an abnormally high number of production platforms,
which will delay the full development of Espoir. [Ref. 16:
p. 56; 40: p. 34] The discovery well is believed capable of
producing up to 20,000 b/d and the field's output could reach
200,000 b/d by the mid-1980s, and possibly 400,000 b/d by
1990. [Ref. 42: p. 6; 15: p. 63]
Production from Esso's Belier and Phillips' Espoir
fields has created a flurry of exploration activity. Four
new exploration permits were granted between March and
November 19 80 alone. Elf Aquitaine and CFP-Totai of France
have started exploring the Ivory Coast again with three
separate concessions. [Ref. 9: p. 31] Agip and partners.
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Union Texas and Total, have taken a concession south of
Abidjan for sea and land exploration. [Ref. 34: p. 452] In
January 19 82, there were six rigs working and more on the way,
but there is no easy access to Ivorian oil. [Ref. 13: p. 178]
Onshore deposits are widely dispersed and offshore there is
deep water and irregular terrain; in both cases, exploration
is an expensive proposition.
3. Reserves and Potential
The Ivory Coast has only one sedimentary basin with
hydrocarbon potential, the Ivory Coast-Ghana Basin, which
extends along the shoreline from southeast Liberia to central
Ghana. Seismic data indicate that the area is extensively
faulted and that tilted fault block structures are common
throughout the area. Fractures in the high quality reservoir
rocks, associated with graben fill and coarse-grained sedi-
mentary rock, have acted as a funneling mechanism for
hydrocarbons. [Ref. 22: p. 42-51] The area's greatest
potential is believed to be offshore in deeper waters, which
remain largely unexplored.
The Ivory Coast has been a bitter lesson for Elf
Aquitaine. The company's geologists predicted that the
country had little potential for producing oil, only to have
Phillips turn up with a major addition to Ivorian reserves —
on a concession abandoned earlier by Elf. [Ref. 18: pp.
44-4 5] The country's proved oil reserves are currently
estimated to be 314 million bbl, bui: the same sources estimate
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that Espoir alone may contain 500 million bbl. [Ref. 12:
p. 85; 15: p. 68]* Both Grand Belier and Espoir have large
natural gas reservoirs, with estimated proved reserves of 37
billion cu. ft. [Ref. 12: p. 85] This is considered to be
a conservative estimate since there has been no incentive to
prove up gas reserves. In addition to conventional oil and
gas deposits, the Ivory Coast also has estimated oil shale
reserves of 3.5 billion bbl. [Ref. 43: pp. 38-39]
If oil prices were to stabilize at $32 per bbl or
higher, and with as much as $4 billion programmed for oil
development investment in the next five years, the potential
for additional commercially exploitable discoveries is high.
[Ref. 42: p. 6] Jean-Yves Baudoin, of Chase Manhattan Bank's
Abidjan office, maintains that 500,000 b/d is not an overly
optimistic figure for Ivorian output in the next five or six
years; and the bank is backing its opinion with a $275 million
loan to tide the Ivory Coast over until the oil flows.
[Ref. 16: p. 63]
G. NIGERIA
1. General
Nigeria is the "Saudi Arabia" of West Africa,
literally dwarfing all other West African oil producers.
The Phillips group is still attempting to define the
limits of its Espoir find. Until that is completed, any
estimates of the field's reserves will be highly speculative
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Total West African crude oil production was reported at
approximately 2.7 million b/d in early 1981, of which over
52 percent came from Nigerian wells. [Ref. 44: pp. 40-42]
In fact, one operating company. Shell Development of Nigeria,
outproduced all of Black Africa's remaining oil producers
combined.
Nigeria's association with oil began in 1908 when oil
seepages motivated a German-owned company to conduct an
unproductive search in the Lagos area. Exploration activity
was resumed in 19 37 by Shell Oil Company. However, it was
1956 before Shell, in partnership with British Petroleum,
made Nigeria's first commercial oil find in the swamps near
Oloibiri. The discovery opened the Niger Delta area, where
Shell's production started at 6,000 b/d in 1958 and had
climbed to a capacity of 1.4 million b/d in 1981. [Ref. 9:
p. 60; 15: p. 52] Nigeria's other major operating companies
are Gulf, Mobil, Agip, and Elf, while those with smaller
holdings include Ashland, Pan Ocean, Texaco/Chevron, Tenneco,
Phillips, and Sunray (see Fig. 12). [Ref. 45: p. 48] Annual
average economic growth has been twice as fast in Nigeria
since oil revenues began escalating in 1967. With crude oil
exports of approximately two million b/d, in 19 80 oil revenues
earned 94 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange and accounted
for over 30 percent of all federally collected revenues.












































































Nigeria, a member of OPEC since 19 71, has had the
most restrictive petroleum policies toward foreign oil
companies of any West African nation. The Nigerian National
Petroleum Company (NNPC) was formed in 19 77 by combining the
functions of the Ministry of Petroleum and the Nigerian
National Petroleum Company, and as such, NNPC has much broader
powers than most other state oil companies. NNPC has a 60
percent equity share in all the foreign oil companies except
for Shell/NNPC, which, owing to the nationalization of Shell's
partner British Petroleum in 1979, is 80 percent government
held. Present government relations with foreign operating
companies are clouded by questions of company incentives and
political uncertainty. [Ref. 9: p. 58]
In late 1979, NNPC was the subject of a government
scandal that hampered the organization's decision-making
process, virtually paralyzing all key decisions concerning
long term projects with the international oil companies.
Between politics and economics, it now appears that long
awaited projects, such as the Bonny LNG complex, will be
delayed indefinitely. [Ref. 16: p. 55] Another major
problem area is the declining level of incentives for for-
eign oil companies to invest more capital, or in some cases,
to even continue their Nigerian operations. Problems of
this nature include: NNPC's initiation of "Risk Service
Contracts" which offer new foreign companies no equity
interest in future production, government imposed production
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ceilings, and unattractive profit margins. To illustrate
the severity of the situation, in 1977 foreign oil companies
were allowed a profit of $.34 on each barrel of oil, since
then official Nigerian oil prices have increased 177 percent,
but company profit margins remained at $.84 per barrel until
August 19 82. In the Shell/NNPC case, the split of revenue
on all production was a ratio of 200:1 in favor of the
government. [Ref. 15: p. 50; 47: p. 2]
In August 19 82, the NNPC increased the allowable
profit margin of the oil companies to $1.60 per barrel. The
new profit policy has provided enough incentive to encourage
the development of existing leases, but it has not been
enough, under current market conditions, to interest the oil
companies to move into the deep water offshore areas that
Nigeria needs to develop. Although these problems are by no
means unique to Nigeria, when Nigeria's policies toward the
oil companies are combined with declining crude oil prices,
the result has been a reluctance by the oil companies to
gamble on leases in unproven frontier regions.
2. Production and Exploration
According to the Petroleum Economist , Nigeria
suffered a massive crude oil production slump of 3 3.2 per-
cent in 1981. With 142 fields on stream, Nigeria produced
493,400,000 bbl in 1981, compared to the 1980 output of
745,327,500 bbl. [Ref. 6: p. 67] The 1931 drop in world
demand for crude oil, combined with Nigeria's refusal to
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adapt its pricing policies to changing market conditions,
precipitated the production nose-dive, which was Nigeria's
lowest output in ten years. Natural gas production was
approximately 865 billion cu. ft., of which 35.3 billion cu.
ft. was consumed domestically -- the remaining 829.9 billion
cu. ft. were flared. [Ref. 9: p. 64]
Many of Nigeria's fields produce less than 10,000
b/d, and anything over 20,000 b/d is considered a big field.
Nigeria's largest operator, Shell, had 78 fields on stream
in 1980, ranging from the 300 b/d Oza field to Forcados Yorki
,
the only field currently producing over 100,000 b/d (See Fig.
13). Mobil is developing its Oso field, which may become
Nigeria's second 100,000 b/d field in 1983. [Ref. 15: pp. 50-
53] In another development, Texaco is planning to boost
Nigerian productive capacity by another 100,000 b/d when its
three new fields come on stream in late 19 82. [Ref. 20: p.
193] While Gulf, Nigeria's second largest operator, is
developing a new offshore field expected to flow at 25,000
b/d. [Ref. 9: p. 60] Nigeria's crude oil output since 1976
is shown in Table 5.
Nigeria, where 45 percent of all wildcats strike
oil, is still the hub of exploration activity in West Africa.
But, Nigeria is not an easy country to work in, reservoirs
are generally small and many are in the difficult Niger
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Figure 13. Southern Nigeria: concessions and key wells.
Reprinted by permission of the American Association
of Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2; pp. 2120-2121]
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*Coinputations based on previous year's production.
[Ref. 9: p. 63; 6: p. 67]
in the swamp areas and the relatively friendly offshore and
inland regions. The June 19 81 active rig count of 20 onshore
and five offshore rigs, had climbed to a total of 23 working
rigs in January 1982. [Ref. 9: p. 61; 13: p. 178]
Although Nigeria's annual discovery of new reserves,
since 1979, has significantly exceeded its annual depletion
rate, the Nigerian government has been anxious to keep
exploration at a high level. President Shagari announced
that SI. 829 billion would be spent in Nigeria for oil
exploration in 19 31, and NNPC has offered virtually all of
Nigeria's unallocated acreage for exploration — albeit at
such unattractive terms that only one private firm took on
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new acreage. [Ref. 48: p. 5; 15: p. 50] Despite the long
list of negative incentives levied both by the Nigerian
government and the hostile operating environment, private
interest in exploration has remained relatively intensive.
Shell, who is operating four land rigs, three swamp rigs,
and one offshore rig, decided in 19 81 to begin development
of their first offshore discovery and they hope to add more
rigs. [Ref. 15: p. 52; 23: p. 193] Gulf has mounted an
aggressive campaign aimed at raising its output capacity to
500,000 b/d by 19 84-85, and based on past performance there
is every reason to believe the company will attain its goal.
[Ref. 45: p. 48] Texaco had set aside $150 million to drill
27 new wells in 1981, in an effort to bring its production
capacity to 130,000 b/d -- double its present capacity.
[Ref. 16: p. 55] Both Agip and Mobil had major discoveries
in 19 81; Mobil's find reportedly has recoverable reserves of
a billion barrels. [Ref. 49: p. 14] And Elf, which accounts
for only five percent of Nigeria's production, but for 20
percent of the country's total exploration expenditures, is
intent en doubling its share of Nigeria's production capacity
by 1985. [Ref. 6: p. 57; 18: pp. 44-45] Each company's
share of Nigeria's 1981 crude oil output is shown in Table 6.
3. Reserves and Potential
Nigeria has access to six sedimentary basins, of
which five are known to have hydrocarbon potential. Nigeria's
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[Ref. 50: p. 2950]
activities are centered in the Niger Delta Basin which is
very similar to the Mississippi Delta in the U.S. Oil and/
or natural gas have been found in the Anambra, Dahomey,
Benue, and Niger-Chad Basins, but their true potential remains
to be determined. The Niger Cone, lying offshore in deep
water, is believed to have limited potential. [Ref. 22:
pp. 16-28, 5 2-58; 51: p. 334] When the government opened
portions of the Niger-Chad, Benue , and Anambra areas to
exploration, there was a great deal of geological interest
expressed, but very little action taken due to the onerous
nature of the attendant contracts. [Ref. 15: p. 50]
Estimates of Nigeria's crude oil reserves range from
16.5 to 20 billion bbl. [Ref. 12: p. 87; 16: p. 55] If
market conditions are favorable, it is estimated that
production could go as high as 2.4 million b/d in 19 85.
[Ref. 44: pp. 40-42] Higher levels of production would
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require the discovery and development of new reserves.
Estimates that output can continue at around 2.0 million b/d
only until the end of the century may have been tempered by
recent discoveries, such as the Mobil and Agip finds, which
suggest that large amounts of oil remain to be found in
Nigeria. According to two of Texaco 's top officials, Nigeria
is "...one of the best oil provinces in the world and the
potential is unlimited ...the real question is incentives
from the government." [Ref. 16: pp. 5 3-55]
However, some experts are predicting that in the long
term, natural gas will take over as Nigeria's principle source
of foreign exchange. Currently, eight Sub-Saharan countries
have proved natural gas reserves; approximately 87 percent
of these are located in Nigeria. [Ref. 37: p. 2947]
Nigeria's proved gas reserves are estimated at around 41
trillion cu. ft. and 80 to 35 percent is nonassociated gas.
[Ref. 15: p. 61] The general consensus is that this is an
extremely conservative estimate, and that more reserves
would be quickly generated if Nigeria could get its LNG
project underway again. The Bonny LNG complex was planned
to have a capacity of 1.9 billion cfd, with a start up cost
of approximately $15 billion. One industry source claims
that there may be enough natural gas potential in Nigeria




when support for the Bonny LNG project began to
collapse, the Bechtel Corporation attempted to interest the
Nigerian government in the development of a trans-Saharan
pipeline, which would have delivered Nigeria's natural gas
to Western European markets and avoided many of the expensive
technical problems associated with LNG. However, since the
pipeline was to cross Algeria, the proposal was rejected by
Nigeria for political reasons. Consequently, international
consumption of Nigerian natural gas remains dependent upon
the development of a Nigerian LNG capability — a prospect
that remains out of the question until the NNPG regains more
political stability, the necessary financial backing is found,
and the international demand for LNG increases substantially.
H. ZAIRE
1. General
The former Belgian Colony of Zaire became Africa's
tenth oil producing country in 1975, when Gulf Oil began
producing crude oil from two small offshore fields in the
mouth of the Zaire River. [Ref. 9: p. 82] A Gulf- led group,
owned 50 percent by Gulf, 32 percent by the Japanese Teikoku
Oil Company, and 18 percent by the Zairian Soliza Oil Company,
has been Zaire's main operator with its three small offshore
fields. [Ref. 52: p. 6] In April 1980, Amoco, Belgium's
Petrofina, and Royal Dutch Shell, began trial production of




In 1979, Zaire exported 6.74 million bbl of the 7.56
million bbl of crude oil that it produced. Zaire's refinery
is not equipped to process Zairian crude oil, which has a
high salt content, and as a result, in 1979 Zaire imported
a total of 6.99 million bbl of crude oil and refined petroleum
products. [Ref. 9; pp. 82-83] Consequently, petroleum does
not rank very high on Zaire's list of export earners, but
considering the country's disastrously high external debt,
any source of constant cash flow must be viewed as a vital
asset — not to mention the benefits reaped from oil self-
sufficiency.
In 19 81, Zaire decided to renegotiate its existing
contracts with the foreign operating companies, and in January
1982, Zaire's state owned Petro-Zaire increased its holdings
in Gulf-Zaire from 15 percent to 20 percent. Under this
agreement, Zaire's share of production was increased from 49
percent to 76 percent, raising government revenues from $60
million in 19 81 to an estimated $160 million in 19 82. [Ref.
52: p. 6] Zaire is maneuvering to gain more control over
its crude oil production, both to maximize government revenues
and to ensure that the state owned SOZIR refinery, with its
new salt removal plant, receives adequate supplies of Zaire's




2. Production and Exploration
The bulk of Zaire's crude oil production comes from
Gulf's three shallow water fields, GCO, Mibale, and Mwanbe,
located in the narrow 25-mile strip of water on the Zaire
River estuary (see Fig. 14). Output from these small fields
declined from a high of 25,122 b/d in 1976, to 17,692 in
19 80; following more development work on the Mibale structure.
Gulf was able to get output back up to 22,56 8 b/d in November
1981. [Ref. 9: p. 55: p. 91] Onshore, in the same vicinity,
Amoco and Petrofina are testing their new field; output from
the two test wells is 1,000 b/d to 1,200 b/d, and if pro-
duction rates hold up, a sustained development program is
expected to follow. [Ref. 15: p. 64] Zaire's cumulative
crude oil production since 19 76 and the 19 81 output from
each field is shown in Table 7.
Table 7
ZAIRIAN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION
FIELD 1981 * CUMULATIVE* *
GCO 1,264 4,767,766
Mibale 17,699 36,457,515
Mwambe 7 26 5,7 76
Mayombe*** 1,00
20,033 41,491,057
*b/d average first six months, 19 81
**Cumulative bbl to 1 July 19 81
***Amoco/Shell onshore trial production
[Ref. 12: p. 142]
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Figure 14: Angola-Cabinda and Republic of Zaire: concessions
and key wells. Reprinted by permission of the
American Association of Petroleum Geologists.
[Ref. 2: p. 2090]
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Although Zaire is only a small producer, interest in
exploration is accelerating: the country's active rig count
went from one in 1980 to three in 1981, and major oil
companies involved in prospecting went from three to ten.
[Ref. 13: p. 178] The most massive exploration programs are
being led by American and French companies. Esso (Exxon) in
partnership with Texaco is spending $40 million to drill two
exploratory wells in Zaire's thick equatorial jungles (see
Fig. 15). The first well near Mbandaka, in Equateur Province,
yielded no evidence of hydrocarbons. The second well, in the
Bandundu region, was begun in the summer of 1981, and if
results are encouraging, more exploration will take place,
[Ref. 16: p. 63; 56: p. 7]
Zaire's other major exploration campaign is being led
by France's Elf Aquitaine in partnership with Mobil, Agip of
Italy, and two Yugoslavian companies. Prospecting off the
Zaire River estuary, Elf discovered oil with its first well.
There has been no information on the size of the discovery,
but the French company wants to drill three appraisal v/slls
and conduct more seismic tests. Elf is reportedly anxious
to locate more drilling rigs to use in exploring the find.
[Ref. 57: p. 26] Gulf, Petrofina, and Amoco were also
prospecting Zairian acreage for new oil.
3. Reserves and Potential
Zaire's current crude oil production comes from the
Congo Basin, which lies along Zaire's coast. Zaire has two
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Figure 15: Republic of Zaire: concessions and key wells.
Reprinted by permission of the American Association
of Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2: p. 2130]
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other sedimentary basins with hydrocarbon potential. The
Congo Fan, which is totally offshore, was described under
"Angola. " The Zaire Basin is located onshore in the dense
jungles of northern Bandundu and southern Equateur Provinces
(see Fig. 15). Until recently the region had remained
unexplored because of the tremendous expense involved, and
because many oilmen had been skeptical of the region's
potential. Esso and Texaco have expressed some confidence
in the area with their sizeable investment, and even though
their first well was dry, a Texaco spokesman has said that
Zaire is one of several "...potentially promising areas where
exploration could develop significant reserves." [Ref. 16:
p. 63]
In January 19 82, Zaire had proved crude oil reserves
of 145 million bbl and natural gas reserves of 50 billion
cu. ft. [Ref. 12: p. 87] In addition to its conventional
oil and gas reserves, Zaire also has the World's fourth
largest shale oil reserves — an estimated 101 billion bbl.
[Ref. 58: p. 83] Results from the recent surge in exploration
activity have caused predictions about Zaire's hydrocarbon
potential to swing decidedly to the optimistic side.
Although Zaire's offshore acreage is not large, the country
shares the same geological formations that have been the
most productive for Angola and Congo; Zaire's inland
potential remains to be seen.
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III. EMERGING PETROLEUM PRODUCING COUNTRIES
A. EQUATORIAL GUINEA
1. General
Alt±iough it is surrounded by Africa's largest con-
centration of oil producing countries. Equatorial Guinea has
only recently begun to solicit oil companies to explore its
territory for oil. However, several problems have detracted
from the country's efforts to achieve this goal. The first
problem for the country's new government has been to deter-
mine the extent of its territorial waters so that it can
grant concessions to oil companies. The rush for Equatorial
Guinea's oil has brought France into conflict with Spain over
exploration rights, and Spain has sent three warships into
the area to defend its interests. Finally, there is an oil
related border dispute brewing with Gabon. [Ref. 13: p. 44-45
The government recently passed a new petroleum law
which is based on the principle of production sharing, and
it has entered into a joint venture with Spain's Hispanoil
to form Empresa Guineano-Sspanola de Petroleos (GSPSA)
.
[Ref. 9: p. 31] Capital interest in GEPSA is equally divided
between the government and Hispanoil. [Ref. 59: p. 149]
GEPSA receives preferential treatment over other oil companies
and has been given wide ranging offshore concessions.
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2. Production and Exploration
-
--III
The first exploration by GEPSA in its 2,000 square
kilometer offshore concession revealed two potential oil
zones: one in the Corisco Bay near Gabon, and the other in
the continental shelf of Bilo (formerly Fernando Po) near
Cameroon and Nigeria. Natural Gas is also believed to be
present in the latter location (see Fig. 16). [Ref. 9: p. 31]
Hispanoil-GEPSA, drilling 60 kilometers off the north coast
of Biko in late December 1981, hit oil in its first well.
Tests have not been completed, but the well is reported to
have strong pressure. Based on reports of equipment orders,
apparently development is to start immediately. [Ref. 60:
p. 20] France's CFP-Total has taken an onshore concession
in Rio Muni Province, and U.S. owned ARACCA Petroleum has
taken the offshore rights adjacent to the Total holding.
[Ref. 61: p. 1] At least five more companies have expressed
an interest in obtaining concessions; three of them are U.S.
companies
.
3. Reserves and Potential
Geologically, Equatorial Guinea shares the , same
sedimentary basins and oil producing structures that support
the offshore production in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon.
Despite the fact that it currently produces no oil, one
source predicts that Equatorial Guinea could be producing
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Figure 16. Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea: concessions and
key wells. Reprinted by permission of the American






Senegal's first large oil deposit was discovered in
1970 by Royal Dutch Shell, 64 kilometers offshore from
Casamance. However, the crude oil from the Dome Flor
reservoir was too heavy to exploit commercially and Shell
allowed its concession to revert to the Senegalese government
in December 1979 (see Fig. 17). [Ref. 63: p. 32] With oil
imports consuming 42 percent of Senegal's annual export
earnings. President Senghor has given oil exploration and
development top priority; but his efforts have been frustrated
both by a dispute with Guinea-Bissau over the ownership of
the offshore deposit and by the cost of extracting Senegal's
heavy crude at current international prices.
In 1981, Senegal formed a state oil corporation,
PETROSEN, to prospect for oil and to coordinate the research
necessary to make the Dome Flor heavy oil deposit technically
and economically feasible. Capitalized by a $470,000 World
Bank loan, the company is 9 percent government owned -- the
remaining 10 percent is held by Senegalese firms. PETROSEN
was scheduled to become an oil development company in 19 82.
[Ref. 64: p. 1239; 65: p. 2]
2. Production and Exploration
In 19 80, Senegal obtained a $17 million loan from
the World Bank for further exploration and development
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concessions and key wells. Reprinted by permission
of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists,
[Ref. 2: p. 2111]
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[Ref. 66: p, 22] Senegal has tentatively decided to exploit
the reservoir, but the plan is plagued with problems. Rising
oil prices initially made the project look better economically,
but heavy crude is difficult to extract from reservoir rock
and it requires expensive enhanced recovery techniques such
as heating the oil in the reservoir with steam injection, or
reducing the oil's viscosity by injecting carbon dioxide;
the oil is also too heavy to be pumped any distance by pipe-
line, so it must be refined near or at the production site.
CFP-Total has discovered a small reservoir of light
crude oil underlying the heavy crude at Dome Flor and pro-
duction is due to start in 1983, with a projected output of
5,000 b/d for five years. According to one estimate, with
the advent of favorable oil prices, production of up to
160,000 b/d of heavy crude could begin as soon as five years
after development start-up. [Ref. 21: p. 86; 67: p. 26]
Senegal also has some limited natural gas production offshore
from Dakar.
3 . Reserves and Potential
Senegal's known petroleum deposits are located in the
Senegal Basin. In general, analogous type basins off the
coast of North America have proved to be poor prospects for
discoveries of gas and oil. Intense exploration since 1953
of the onshore and Continental Shelf has resulted in the
drilling of over 80 wells. Except for the production of
small am.ounts of oil from the Dakar Peninsula in the early
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1960s and the discovery, on the shelf, of shallow heavy oil
and the light oil deposits beneath, no significant discoveries
of oil and gas have been made. Deep water areas of the
continental shelf and upper continental rise are still
relatively unexplored by drilling; but the results of sparse
drilling indicates a possible lack of reservoir rock. [Ref.
22: pp. 28-36]
Crude oil reserves in the Dome Flor oil field are
estimated to be 733 million bbl of heavy crude and 14.6
million bbl of light crude. [Ref. 63: p. 16] Senegal's
proved natural gas reserves are considered sufficient to
fuel the gas turbine electric power plant they now supply
until 1995. [Ref. 69: p. 246]
C. TOGO-BENIN
1. General
Oil was discovered in Benin by the Union Oil Company
of California in 196 8. At that time, the find was considered
unprofitable for development and the field reverted to the
government of Benin. Ten years and several oil price increases
later, the government finally found a firm willing to tackle
the development of the field -- Saga Petroleum AS, of Norway.
The field is being developed via a service contract for the
government of Benin. Saga has no equity interest and is
concerned only with the field's management. Benin borrowed
the development capital, and NojT.vay is guaranteeing 90
oercent of the loan. [Ref. 70: p. 69]
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2. Production and Exploration
Development of Seme field, which began 14 April 19 80,
is expected to cost $125 million. [Ref. 71: p. 70] The
field is located 12.5 miles offshore and is scheduled to come
on production in November 1982, with an output of between
5,000 and 15,000 b/d (see Fig. 18). [Ref. 33: p. 5345; 72:
p. 2] The field has heavy 22.0 gravity crude and is still
considered to be a marginal operation, but even with a pro-
duction rate of only 5,000 b/d, it would provide enough to
satisfy Benin's oil needs, with approximately 6 52,000 bbl
a year left for export. [Ref. 9: p. 13; 20: p. 192]
While Benin is well on its way to becoming an oil
exporter in 19 82, its next door neighbor, Togo, has not been
as lucky. The Togolese government has actively encouraged
exploration and several companies have prospected some of its
likely areas. In 1978, its entire offshore concession was
awarded to Oceanic Resources of the U.S. [Ref. 33: p. 5345]
In an earlier effort. Union Carbide Corporation drilled two
offshore wells that had noncommercial shows (see Fig. 18).




The Dahomey and Niger Cone Basins, which cover the
entire Togo-Benin offshore areas, were discussed earlier, as
was the Volta Basin, which occupies a portion of Togo. [Ref.
22: pp. 14-16, 52-53] Although Benin's Seme field has crude
oil reserves estimated at 20 -co 22 million bbl, the likelihood
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Figure 18. Togo and Benin: concessions and key wells.
Reprinted by permission of the American Association
of Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 62: p. 1302]
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of major discoveries by either country is diminished by the
small basin area that is available to them. However, two
of the basins have known hydrocarbon deposits, and the Togo-
Benin offshore area has been classified as a high potential
area. [Ref. 20: p. 192]

IV. POTENTIAL PETROLEUM PRODUCING COUNTRIES
A. CHAD
1. General
Drilling for oil in land-locked Chad began in December
1973, following three years of exploration by Conoco, partner
in a group with Esso, Shell and Chevron. The group had two
significant discoveries, one in the Kanem region north of
Lake Chad, and another in the Salamat region in the Chari
Basin (see Fig 19); but the country's civil war stalled both
operations. [Ref. 26: p. 15; 9: p. 19]
The terms for Conoco 's permits are for five years,
with options for two five year renewals. The contract
obligated the group to spend at least $5.67 million in the
first five years, but over $18 million were spent the first
four years. The government of Chad retains the ownership of
all petroleum resources and companies who engage in explo-
ration must state specifically in their contract the details
of each proposed activity. [Ref. 26: p. 15]
2. Production and Exploration
After seven years of exploration, oil production
began briefly at the Kanem field at a rate of 1,500 b/d, and
Conoco had begun building a pipeline to transport the oil to
the refinery at Ndjamena when the company shut down operations
for securitv reasons in late 19 79. Conoco has made a total
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of five discoveries -- the finds in the Salamat region are
considered worthy of exploitation. [Ref. 9: p. 19] Esso is
also conducting exploration, and the results have made the
company hopeful that commercial reserves will eventually be
proven in Chad. [Ref. 73: p. 5] In January 1982 there was
one active rig in Chad. [Ref. 13: p. 178]
3. Reserves and Potential
The Niger-Chad Basin, which extends from eastern Mali
to the Central African Republic and covers a large portion
of Chad, was believed to have very little oil and gas potential,
However, limited wildcat successes have renewed geological
interest in the basin, particularly in the Lake Chad and
Salamat regions, where the Benue Trough from Nigeria inter-
sects the Niger-Chad Basin. The relationship of the two
discovery areas in Chad, and their overall relationship to
the Benue Trough is poorly understood. It is believed, how-
ever, that the discoveries in the two exploration areas are
significant, but they require further evaluation. [Ref. 22:
pp. 16-28] Exxon's Vice President for Production stated that
"...the potential petroleum plays [in Chad] are diverse and
have a high risk of turning out dry — but there is an cut-
side chance of finding very large reserves." [Ref. 73: p. 5]
3. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)
Geologically, the Central African Republic is relatively
devoid of sedimentary structures having hydrocarbon potential.
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The only area thought to have possibilities is a narrow strip
of land along the border with Chad, where the Niger-Chad Basin
extends slightly into the country (see Fig. 19). [Ref. 22:
pp. 20-22] Exploration for petroleum in the Republic has
been limited to seismic and gravity surveys. The Conoco,
Esso, Shell, Chevron group had seismic teams in the country
in 19 77 and 19 79, and planned to resume its seismic work in
1981; Esso is currently conducting seismic exploration in the
area. [Ref. 73: p. 5] Exploration activities in this border
region are an extension of the play in Chad where oil and
gas discoveries in 1979 indicate a definite possibility of
future oil discoveries in the Central African Republic.
[Ref. 22: p. 28]
C. NIGER
There has been considerable exploration interest in Niger
since 1960, involving Conoco, Sunoil, Texaco, Esso, Shell,
and Elf Aquitaine. Several exploratory wells have been
drilled in the country, and at least one, a Texaco-Esso well
drilled in the Tin Toumna region of the Sahara Desert north
of Lake Chad, had hydrocarbon shows (see Fig. 20). [Ref. 26:
p. 17] Niger is geographically similar to Chad, but the
Niger-Chad Basin which covers most of the country is believed
to have only a minor oil and gas potential in its deeper
graben areas. [Ref. 22: pp. 16-22] The region with the
greatest potential may be in the Lake Chad region. The
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Fiaure 19. Northern Cameroon, Chad, and Central African
Republic: concessions and key wells. Reprinted
bv oermission of the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists. [Re; 9 . o. 2096]
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Figure 20. Niger: concessions and key wells. Reprinted
by permission of the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2: p. 2119]
Q?

Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation believes there are
potentially large oil deposits in the lake area and has
announced that it will drill three exploratory wells in the
Nigerian portion of the lake basin. [Ref. 23: p. 18] Niger
has offered new concessions to encourage exploration in the
country, and as of January 19 82 there were five drilling rigs
active in the country. [Ref. 13: p. 178]
D. MALI
Exploration of the Taoudeni and Niger-Chad Basins in Mali
probably was spurred by the large oil and gas discoveries in
the related geological foinnations in Algeria. Currently,
Elf Aquitaine is conducting seismic exploration in the north-
ern portion of the Taoudeni Basin, v/hile Esso is drilling a
well in the southern part of the basin (see Fig. 21) . [Ref.
74: p. 5; 73: p. 3] Both companies feel that the basin has
the potential for commercial discoveries, and to encourage
evaluation of the potential, the World Bank has extended a
loan to Mali for petroleum exploration. [Ref. 23: p. 13]
Although the Taoudeni Basin covers 500,000 square kilometers
of Mali, the rock structures that produce oil and gas for
Algeria aren't as thick as in Mali, and they may not have been
adequately sealed throughout much of their hydrocarbon forming
history. [Ref. 75: p. 2; 22: pp. 9-14] In addition to Mali's
parsimonious geological endowments, the remoteness of the
region would require a relatively large discovery in order for















1 SNEA, MURPHY, SUNNING04LE, COMORO
2 SNEA
=^0
Figure 21. Mali: concessions and key wells. Reprinted by
permission of the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2: p. 2117]
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E. GUINEA - GUINEA-BISSAU
1. General
Onshore and near-shore petroleum exploration in Guinea
and Guinea-Bissau during their late colonial period, by several
multinational oil companies, failed to produce results for
either country. The findings of an Esso cam.paign, off Guinea-
Bissau from 1966 to 1974, were officially described as
indefinite — "...carried out in limited areas and at limited
depths." [Ref. 76: p. 14] Later in Guinea, three offshore
campaigns that covered 7695 square kilometers, from December
1973 through August 19 80, produced equally "indefinite"
results. [Ref. 77: p. 12] Renewed offshore activity by
Senegal and the results of a Guinea-Bissau sponsored survey
of offshore potential have interested both countries in offshore
exploration again. However, their efforts to acquire "instant
oil wealth" have precipitated a dispute over the ownership
of the offshore areas thought to have some of the best
exploration possibilities
Guinea-Bissau has established a state-owned corporation,
PETROMINAS, to manage its petroleum interests, and has hired
the New York-Lisbon based Atlantic Resources to organize the
collection of geophysical data. [Ref. 76: p. 14] The data
is to be used as the basis for international competition for
drilling concessions by means of a "call for bids." [Ref. 78:
p. 5] The exploration phase of this effort was financed by
a $6.3 million credit from the World Bank. [Ref. 40: p. 21]
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Guinea has also formed a state-owned company, SOGUIP, and
hired the German firm, Geosurvey International, to survey its
continental shelf and some of its onshore areas. [Ref. 77:




The major thrust of Guinea-Bissau's recent exploration
efforts has been on the continental shelf beyond contested
areas (see Fig. 17) . Under the direction of Atlantic Research,
the British firm, DIGICON, began seismic work off Guinea-Bissau
on 3 February 1981. [Ref. 79: p. 3] When the results of the
DIGICON survey were released, 30 international oil companies
expressed interest in obtaining concessions. [Ref. 80: p. 8]
In December 1981, Guinea concluded an oil and gas exploration
contract with an Australian group. Bright Oil. The contract,
with both on and offshore rights, commits the group to spend
$15 million per year for three years and to begin drilling in
1983. [Ref. 81: p. 3303]
3. Reserves and Potential
Guinea Bissau has access to only one sedimentary basin
capable of producing petroleum, the Senegal Basin, which is
generally believed to lack the physical properties necessary
to generate large quantities of hydrocarbons. This conclusion
is based on the relatively intense exploration that the region
has received and the fact that geologically it has been a "cold"
basin. [Ref. 22: pp. 35-36] However, a recent study by the
Belgian Engineer, George Brogncn, who discovered large
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reservoirs of oil in Angola, differs with this opinion. Mr,
Brognon's study concluded that, in addition to the known de-
posit at Dome Flor, the more distant offshore areas along the
outer reaches of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau's contintental
shelf have a high probability of producing commercial reserves.
[Ref. 78: p. 5]
F, LIBERIA - SIERRA LEONE
1. General
For the first time in several years oil exploration
activity is beginning again in both Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Sierra Leone, whose oil imports consume almost all of the
country's foreign exchange earnings, reported in May 19 81 that
oil had been found in the Turner's Peninsula area but no
figures were released. [Ref. 9: p. 66] Oil exploration in
Liberia had been limited to four offshore wells drilled before
1973 by three U.S. companies. Although hydrocarbon deposits
were found in the wells, the exploration effort was abandoned.
[Ref. 32: p. 118]
Liberia's Bureau of Hydrocarbons has been given the
responsibility for managing the country's petroleum development
interests. Liberia has also hired J.C. Ferrand and Associates
of Houston to compile a geological and geophysical study of
Liberia's potential oil and gas bearing regions. Interested
oil companies must purchase the study at a cost of $350,000
before submitting exploration proposals to the government.
Contracts will be awarded under Liberia's revised Petroleum
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Act which stipulates a production sharing agreement providing
for accelerated recovery of oil company expenditures, followed
by an escalation of the government's share based on increases
in the pretax rate of return. [Ref. 83: p. 70] Sierra Leone's
Parlimentary Exploration, Mining, and Processing of Mineral
Oil Agreement requires oil companies to pay a cash bonus of
20 Lebnes per retained square mile of land with exploitable
discoveries. The companies must also pay a cash bonus of
$500,000 when production for any 30-day period reaches 75,000
b/d, $2 million for 200,000 b/d, and $3 million for 300,000
b/d. [Ref. 84: p. 2]
2. Production and Exploration
In Sierra Leone, Mobil is acting as the operator on
several offshore concessions held by the Arracca Group of
Oxoco, Sundance, and Mobil (see Fig. 22). [Ref. 85: p. 296]
A wildcat drilled by Mobil off Turner's point in June 19 81
produced oil and gas shows, and Mobil called its geophysical
exploration ship, the T.W. Nelson, to the site to survey a
more detailed grid location of likely oil structures for the
final positioning of drilling rigs. [Ref. 35: p. 296; 86:
p. 1] Mobil plans to resume test drilling in April 1982 and
if commercial deposits are found, production could begin in
19 35. Sierra Leone has also granted a concession to two U.S.
oil companies for onshore exploration. [Ref. 37: p. 56]
Liberia has granted a 1.2 million acre onshore concession




Figure 22: Sierra Leone: Aracca-Mobil concession. Reprinted
by permission of the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2: p. 2125]
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the Roberts and Bassa sub-basins. [Ref. 88: p. 12] Katana's
geologists are mainly interested in the Roberts Basin in the
Monrovia area, where a geochemical survey has indicated the
presence of hydrocarbons (see Fig. 23) . The first of two
Katana wildcats was scheduled to begin on 14 March 19 82.
[Ref. 83: p. 70] Approximately two dozen oil companies have
expressed an interest in concessions to Liberia's offshore
regions, which were to be opened for bid in June 19 82. [Ref.
82: p. 118]
3. Reserves and Potential
The only large sedimentary regions with hydrocarbon
potential in Sierra Leone or Liberia are the coastal and
continental shelf areas. Until recently, the oil industry
had shown little interest in the area because of the thin
sedimentary sections, and because seismic surveys had indicated
a possible lack of reservoir rocks. A much thicker sedimentary
section underlies the lower slope and rise of the continental
shelf, and there may be structural similarities with similar
regions off the Ivory Coast. [Ref. 22: pp. 37-42] In a
recent interview, a Mobil official rated Sierra Leone's oil
and gas potential as fair to good. In Liberia, preliminary
geological evaluations by Katana's geologists indicate a
potential for hydrocarbon entrapments that they believe are
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FicTure 23: Liberia: concessions and key wells. Reprinted
by permission of the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists. [Ref. 2: p. 2115]
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V. CONSTRAINTS ON THE DSVSLOPflENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES
West African oil has several advantages over oil from
other regions, particularly for Western consumers. First,
oil produced in West Africa is conveniently located near
Western markets and has transportation advantages over oil
from the Middle East. Much of West Africa's crude oil is high
quality light crude, which has a high gasoline content and
satisfies the technical requirements of many Western refineries.
The petroleum tax laws of West African producing countries
are generally less developed than the systems in force both
in the OPEC countries and the North Sea; taxes on petroleum
profits in West Africa average less than 50 percent, compared
to more than 80 percent in the North Sea, and even higher in
the Middle East. [Ref. 18: p. 44-45] Finally, the West
African region is considered to be politically more stable
than its Middle East counterpart.
Despite the many advantages that West African oil supplies
have for Western Markets, the development of oil in this region
is dependent upon several critical factors. One of the most
important variables affecting the development of West African
oil reserves is the international economics of supply and
demand for petroleum products. Most deposits of oil and gas
in West Africa are commercially marginal propositions. It
ft
' was the higher oil prices after 19 7 3 that provided the
-02

incentive to intensify the search for new oil deposits and
to increase output from existing fields in the region. However,
because oil and gas from other sources, such as the Persian
Gulf is significantly less expensive to produce, the
development of West African petroleum resources depends upon
international demand levels and price structures that will
induce oil companies to continue to make the necessary
investments.
One indicator that can be used to judge a region's
economic potential as a petroleum producer is its level of
drilling activity. It has been estimated that the ratio of
oil wells drilled in the United States, when com.pared to the
number of wells drilled in developing countries is 140-to-l.
Until recently. West Africa's drilling activity was even
lower; but in 19 82, approximately 2,000 oil and gas wells will
be drilled off the coast, which is almost twice as many as in
1981. [Ref. 21: p. 86] Regardless of the economics of supply
and demand, it is apparent that leaders of the "have-not"
nations are going to keep pressing for the development of
their domestic oil supplies. Nonetheless, there are physical
and political constraints at work which can blunt the ambitions
of national leaders and dampen the enthusiasm of private
investors, even in oil regions that are potentially lucrative.
One of the major constraints that oil producers in West
Africa must contend with is the physical nature of the region
itself. West Africa is known in the trade as a "harsh
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environment" for oil production -- it is not an easy area in
which to operate. For instance, many of Nigeria's most
productive oil fields are located in the muck of the Niger
Delta swamp; onshore exploration in Zaire must contend with
dense tropical jungles; and many countries like land-locked
Chad, Mali, and Niger have almost no infrastructure for
access, transportation, or processing of their potential
petroleum reserves. Even West Africa's geology contributes
to the region's difficult operating conditions. Typically,
West Africa's oil bearing structures tend to trap hydrocarbons
in many small, shallow pockets, rather than in large reservoirs
as in Mexico or Saudi Arabia. This not only makes the deposits
more difficult to locate, it also requires many small wells,
which are more expensive than a few large wells. Moreover,
the deposits tend to be widely dispersed; many occur in deep
water, over irregular seabeds; or they have extremely high
pressures and heat — all of which require the latest and
most expensive technology, and add years to development lead
times. [Ref. 89: p. 275]
For reasons of cost and technology, West Africa's most
readily accessible prospective areas were explored first, and
as a result, exploration has progressively moved into even
harsher environments — the deeper offshore and more remote
continental interior — where time to position and drill a
well takes much longer and the cost is much higher. For
example, onshore wells in mature producing areas, such as the
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U.S., could be drilled in 1979 for up to $100,000; similar
wells in the interior of Africa were costing $3 to $5 million,
and deepwater offshore wells, $20 million or more. [Ref. 89:
p. 265]
It should be emphasized that the prospect of small dis-
coveries is not a factor which inhibits the exploration of
new areas. Improvements in exploration technology have
enhanced the oil industry's ability to find smaller fields,
consequently, the number of discoveries and volume of reserves
found in smaller fields have been steadily increasing. Despite
their economic drawbacks, small fields can be important to a
developing country, and cumulatively to the diversity and
total size of an oil company's reserves. [Ref. 89: pp. 275-
279]
The other potential constraint to the development of West
African oil is political. Once a region is perceived to have
geological potential for hydrocarbons, two conditions must be
fulfilled before exploration can occur: there must be access
to the acreage and the terms of exploration must be acceptable
to all parties involved. [Ref. 39: p. 262] Both of these
conditions are determined by government policies which are
not always consistent with oil companies' views of their own
economic needs. Even when satisfactory conditions are
established at the outset, arbitrary changes to the rules can




Citing the Nigeria case, a senior Mobil executive made
the point that "since it entered Nigeria to explore for oil
in 19 55, Mobil's business has been affected more by government
policy than anything else except for our own success in
establishing commercial production." [Ref. 90: p. 3] Nigeria
has a long history of changing the rules of the game, for
both political and economic reasons: in April 1971, Elf-
Aquitaine was forced to sell 35 percent of its Nigerian
operations to Nigeria; in July 1971, Nigeria joined OPEC and
adopted OPEC guidelines in its dealings with foreign oil
companies; in 1977, Nigeria formed the Nigerian National
Petroleum Company (NNPC) and nationalized Esso's local marketing
subsidiary; in 1979, Nigeria introduced "service only" contracts
which deny new foreign operators equity shares in production;
in August 1979, Nigeria nationalized all of British Petroleum's
Nigerian operations; and in 19 30, the "Oilgate" scandal
paralyzed the NNPC and all of its long term hydrocarbon develop-
ment projects with foreign oil companies. [Ref. 9: pp. 57-58]
Nigeria is not by any means the only troublesome oil
producing nation in West Africa. Almost every oil producing
nation is currently angling to get a larger share of the
petroleum profits, while the foreign oil companies are working
to achieve the opposite ends. Angola and Nigeria are two
examples of countries who have established prcduction celings
or allowables to stretch out the depletion of their reserves,
which also stretches out the time it takes for oil companies
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to recover their expenses. Local bureaucracies up and down
the West African coast make conducting day-to-day business a
lengthy and frustrating process that is exacerbated by
institutionalized corruption. [Ref. 15: p. 48] Finally,
there are countries like Angola with endemic political
instability, where Gulf Oil Corporation has withstood two
decades of revolution, and where potentially productive
regions like the Estosha Basin cannot be explored until hos-
tilities are arrested. However, the industry's widespread
drilling history suggests that most political constraints,
short of open hostility, can be overcome if geologic prospects
are good. [Ref. 89: p. 279]
The overriding consideration governing oil company
investment in West Africa has been their estimates of inter-
national demand for petroleum products, and with few exceptions,
political constraints have not significantly dampened their
activities or interests in the development of West Africa's
reserves. It is true that political factors halted the
operations of Conoco in Chad in 19 79, Gulf in Angola in 19 75,
deterred development investment in Ghana following the
Rawlings' coup, and contributed to Nigeria's inability to
interest oil companies in offers to expand their exploration
into new regions in 19 79; but on the whole, the politics of
West Africa have been more of a frustration than a constraint
on the operations of oil companies; however, if foreign oil
company executives perceive a long-term decline developing in
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the international demand for crude oil. West African politics
could become a decisive factor in the future investment
calculus of the foreign oil coapanies.
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VI. REGIONAL CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL
The petroleum industry in West Africa began late and
developed slowly; production first began in 19 5 6 in Angola,
followed by Gabon in 1957, Nigeria in 1958, and the Congo in
1960. After that, there was a 15 year lull in activity, until
a flurry of new discoveries introduced five more West African
oil producers. First, it was Zaire in 1975, then Cameroon in
1977, Ghana in 1978, Chad flickered briefly in 1979, and the
Ivory Coast came on stream in 19 80. Today, almost every West
African country from the Ivory Coast to Angola has an oil
discovery that is in commercial production, and by 19 86, Benin,
Senegal, and Equatorial Guinea could join the list.
With 2,191 wells on production, output from the West
African region was slightly over 2.7 million b/d in 1979 —
the bulk of it, 2.3 million b/d coming from Nigeria. [Ref. 44:
pp. 40-42] In January 1982, there were 79 active drilling
rigs in West Africa, which was a 58 percent increase over the
previous year, and the region's 100 percent rig utilization
rate in 1980-81 was the world's highest. [Ref. 13: p. 178;
91: p. 125] Despite vastly improved production capacities by
most West African countries, and a very high level of explo-
ration and development activity, the 19 80-81 slack in world
demand for crude oil caused a decline of 2 7 percent in West
Africa's 1981 output. Nigeria suffered the brunt of the
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cut-back with a 33,2 percent production slump. Table 8 depicts
the trends in West African crude oil production from 19 76 to
1981.
Table 8
WEST AFRICA: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION TRENDS ('000 b/d)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1931
Angola 151.9 141. 8 136.3 145.2 148.6 140.0
Cameroon • • • .8 12.5 35.1 79.3 87.0
Congo 35.7 32.9 49.2 55.2 65.9 79.0
Gabon 227.5 226.3 212.9 196. 8 178.6 147.0
Ghana • • • • • • 5.0 5.0 2.1 2.1
Ivory Coast • • • • • a . • • • 7.0 7.0
Nigeria 2,,078.1 2,067.8 1,902.9 2,299.4 2,038.
8
1,369.0
Zaire 25.1 22.6 22.9 20. 7 17.7 20.0
Total 2,518.3 2,492.2 2,341.7 2,757.4 2,538.0 1,851.1
[Ref. 9: pp. 12-83; 12: p. 87]
Estimates of a region's potential or capability to produce
petroleum are based on the conventions of probability, which
at best are subject to errors in expert judgement, and at
worst, to the tendency of the "official mind" to assume
implicitly that supply is somehow unresponsive to price changes
For example, in the 1880' s, the U.S. Geological Survey solemnly
reported that little if any oil of commercial value would be
found in Texas or California. [Ref. 92: p. 5] Equally gloomy
reports can be found about the west coast of Africa; among
them, as recently as 19 80, the Ivory Coast was believed to
possess only a modest potential, and Equatorial Guinea was
not even recognized as a potential player. Yet today. West
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Africa has 35 percent of Africa's proved oil reserves and
21 percent of the continent's proved natural gas reserves.
[Ref. 16: p. 52]
On 1 January 19 82, West Africa's estimated proved crude
oil reserves stood at 20.7 billion bbl and natural gas
reserves were 49.2 trillion cu. ft. The estimated proved
reserves of each country are shown in Table 9.
Table 9
WEST AFRICA: SSTIJ4ATED PROVED RESERVES, 1 JANUARY 19 82











** (billion cu. ft.
)
[Ref. 12: p. 87]
The first law of petroleum economics says that discoveries
are directly proportional to investment made in exploration;
and recent discoveries, such as the Phillips Espoir find, have
apparently motivated the multinational oil companies to re-
double their commitment in West Africa. In 19 80, spending by
U.S. oil companies in West Africa was estimated to be only
$942 million; but in 1931, spending jumped to $1,565 billion,
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and current plans call for outlays of $1,755 billion in 1982
and S5.399 billion in 1983 — an increase of 350 percent over
the 1981 level. [Ref. 93: p. 5]
While most of West Africa's oil discoveries have been in
the small category commercially, there have been some important
surprises; and current reserves and production figures are
likely to rise as more recently discovered fields are defined
and put into production in the near future. Exploration efforts
underway in the region, could, by 19 85, yield an additional
oil flow of at least 1.0 million b/d, and output could go even
higher if politically imposed production allowables are re-
laxed. According to Petroconsultants of Houston, by 19 90
Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast
could be producing at rates of from 15,000 b/d for Equatorial
Guinea to 360,000 b/d for the Ivory Coast. [Ref. 94: p. 58]
An indication of the region's petroleum export potential can
be seen in Table 10 which contains the estimated ultimate
production capacities and the 19 79 domestic oil consumption
rates for the countries listed.
Substantial increases in West African natural gas production
are also anticipated in the next decade. A recent study
identified 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with some po-
tential for natural gas production; twelve of the countries
were in West Africa and eight already have proved gas reserves.
[Ref. 95: p. 100] However, natural gas production has several




WEST AFRICA: CRUDE OIL EXPORT POTENTIAL (b/d)






Equatorial Guinea 15,000 500
Gabon 180,000 11,200
Ghana 50,000 17,640




West Africa Total 3,650,000 b/d 183,000 b/d
*These are estimates of West Africa's physical capability to
produce oil and are based on the assumption that the necessary
political and economic conditions will exist to permit full
development of the region's petroleum reserves.
**Nigeria's domestic oil consumption increased to an average
of 165,800 b/d in 19 80. Domestic oil consumption for the
countries listed is estimated to be approximately 500,000 b/d
in the year 2000.
[Source: compilation of previously cited references]
be overcome before any potential can be realized. The largest
and perhaps overwhelming disadvantage is the tremendous
amount of capital required for gas collection systems, lique-
faction/regasification facilities, LNG tankers, terminals for
the tankers, and LNG storage facilities. Assuming these
requirements are satisfied, Africa could be producing over 25
percent of the world's supply of natural gas by 1990, and if
the economic incentive increases to prove up new gas reserves.
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up to half of Africa's gas production could come from West
African reserves.* [Ref. 96: p. 35]
In effect there has been an "oil rush" on West Africa,
but considering lead times on the order of six to twelve years
from initial discovery to development of commercial production,
much remains to be done. It has been estimated that as much
as 80 percent of Africa's petroleum reserves remain to be
discovered, and that discoverable reserves on the continent
and offshore, over the next 20 years, could reach 51.3 billion
bbl, or 14 percent of worldwide discoveries in the same
period. [Ref. 26: p. 3; 44: pp. 40-42] Appreciable amounts
of this oil will undoubtedly come from countries in West
Africa
—
yet, many of those countries have not been drilled
with sufficient intensity to evaluate their petroleum potential
[Ref. 95: p. 104] For instance, Elf Aquitaine's geologists
say that, except for a few areas, large portions of the off-
shore from the southern border of Gabon to Namibia remain
relatively untouched and many years of potentially productive
drilling lie ahead for the countries there. [Ref. 23: p. 18]
Table 11 shows the potential for future discoveries of
commercial value in the West African countries.
Obviously West Africa has not been thoroughly explored
and more cetroleum remains to be discovered there. But the
Obviously, such predictions are problematical since they
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[Source: Compilation of previously cited references and
author's conclusions]
key question is, how much will be found — will discoveries in
West Africa be large enough to alter the free world's dependence
on oil from the Persian Gulf? On a global scale, half of the
world's known oil reserves are in 28 super-giant fields, with
more than five billion bbl each; twenty- four of these are in
the Middle East and there is one each in Venezuela, Mexico,
Texas, and the North Slope. [Ref. 89: p. 258] Few of the
basins which have been explored in recent years have contained
structures where super-giant fields might be found, and none
of the unexplored basins appear to have the geologic
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characteristics required for a series of super-giants. Thus,
the prospects of finding another Middle East would appear to
be nil. To the contrary/ the number of discoveries and
volume of reserves found in smaller fields (fewer than 50
million bbl) has been steadily increasing, and the smaller
fields are tending to become the prime exploration targets.
[Ref. 89: p. 258]
From 1950 to 1975, 800 exploratory wells were drilled in
the Persian Gulf region, finding more than 200 billion bbl
of crude oil, while West Africa, with over 2100 wells, has
produced reserves of slightly over 20 billion bbl. [Ref. 1:
p. 205] At their peak production level in 1979, the Persian
Gulf countries were producing 21. 1 million b/d; in March 1982, their
output had fallen to 12.15 million b/d, giving them an excess
production capacity of 8.85 million b/d. [Ref. 97: p. 9]
1979 was also West Africa's peak production year, with 2.75
million b/d; however, current excess production capacity is
less than one million b/d. If there was a maximum effort by
all parties in West Africa, the region's production capacity
might eventually reach 5.0 million b/d.
Considering that it took the West Africans almost three
times as many wells, spread over a much larger area, to
produce one- tenth the reserves and output of the Persian Gulf,
it does not seem plausible to assume that West African pe-
troleum will likely diminish the importance of the Persian
Gulf, especially since a small but increasing percentage of
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West African production will probably be required for domestic
consumption. Barring very large discoveries, the combined
output from new and future West African producers is unlikely
to challenge Nigeria as the region's preeminent oil producer.
Still the opportunity posed by West Africa remains great.
Large gaps exist in our knowledge of West Africa's petroleum
potential, and even if the probability of discovering giant
or supergiant oil fields is very low, there is a high




VII. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF OIL: THE OIL SYNDROME
The recent oil boom in West Africa has predictably
generated increasingly optimistic hopes regarding the region's
growth potential. Many African leaders view oil as a
"mystical elixer" that can fuel their countries' long-awaited
economic takeoffs and lead to more social cohesion, greater
political stability, meaningful industrialization, and an
eventual advanced-country status. [Ref. 98: p. 814] However,
justifications for these expectations are both over-stated
and difficult to document. In fact, the record is rather
clear that the discovery of oil in most developing countries
has been, at best, a mixed blessing. [Ref. 98: p. 815]
While the beneficial aspects of oil income, such as more
favorable balance of payments, higher economic growth rates,
increased stability for economic planning, and in some cases,
higher standards of living, are undeniable, political and
economic forces at work in Sub-Saharan Africa can make it
difficult to translate these benefits into lasting economic
development. The introduction of oil revenues can actually
serve to exacerbate rather than alleviate development problems
[Ref. 58: p. 2] Moreover, few oil-exporting countries have
found a strategy that can solve the distributional problems
created by a sudden influx of petroleum revenues. These
problems include: 1) transforming their oil revenues into
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long-term economic infrastructure with a capacity for self-
sustained growth through a balanced economy; and 2) equitably
distributing the energy resources and the revenues derived
from them along regional, sectoral, and social lines. [Ref.
99: p. 4] These problems have recurred so frequently in so
many different countries with dissimilar economies that
analysts have begun to view them as part of an overall socio-
economic dysfunction called the "oil syndrome". [Ref. 98:
p. 815] Four elements of this syndrome are particularly
relevant to the West Africa case.
First, petroleum extraction is almost always an enclave
sector. Because of the skills and capital required, the
petroleum industry in third world countries is inherently
more externally oriented than agriculture or manufacturing
industries. Backward and forward linkages with other sectors
of the economy in the form of demand for goods and services
are minimal. [Ref. 100: p. 1; 101: p. 1; 99: p. 3] In
addition, the capital intensive nature of the oil industry
means that large investments create few jobs for domestic
labor. For example, oil provides over 90 percent of Nigeria's
foreign earnings, but only absorbs one to two percent of its
labor force; and in Gabon, oil employs only approximately
1,000 Gabonese. [Ref. 99: p. 3; 102: p. 3] Thus, the
development of an oil industry is in itself not sufficient




Second, the fact that petroleum is an exhaustible resource
raises unique technical and politico-economic issues. First,
there is the need to establish an optimal technical rate of
extraction. [Ref. 99: p. 3] This rate varies from well to
well and plays a significant role in determining the amount
of oil that can ultimately be recovered over the life of a
well. Second, the government must determine the optimal
social rate of extraction — i.e., the rate which will provide
the best mix of short and long term returns to the economy
and society as a whole. If the rate is too rapid, it may
generate more revenue than the national economy is capable of
absorbing productively, creating an inflationary situation.
Rather than lose the nation's earnings through inflation, it
may be more rational to leave the oil in the ground where it
can appreciate and stretch the nation's income over more years.
[Ref. 99: p. 4]
Third, increasing oil exports can indirectly undermine
other sectors of the economy. As oil exports increase, the
sudden influx of foreign exchange causes the domestic currency
to appreciate relative to other currencies. This simultaneously
reduces the international competitiveness of other domestic
export sectors by increasing the price of their goods on
foreign markets and the in-cernal competitiveness of domestic
producers by decreasing the relative prices of imported food
and manufactured goods. Only non- traded goods and services
such as construction are not adversely affected by the
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increasing exchange rate differential. [Ref. 98: pp. 816,
822; 101: p. 1]
Fourth, the sudden sense of unlimited wealth that
accompanies rising oil exports often leads to massive public
spending that is not only wasteful, but harmful, both socially
and economically. In most oil producing countries oil reve-
nues go directly to the government. A predictable result
has been an expansion of government payrolls, a boom in
government funded construction, and more generally increased
spending on prestige projects of dubious merit. Less in-
sidiously, large injections of capital into the public sector
can overload a country's physical and managerial infrastructure,
leading to ill-conceived and inefficiently managed projects.
[Ref. 98: pp. 822-826; 101: p. 1]
The real problem is not government spending per se ;
rather it is the timing of the spending that is critical.
All oil exporting countries share the same three goals: to
raise the living standards of the present generation, to
follow a development strategy which can ensure the welfare of
future generations, and to reduce dependence on oil through
domestic economic diversification; and most of these countries
have formulated development plans with targets to guide them
toward these goals. The problem is that, once the goals have
been agreed upon and targets set, there is a tendency to
ignore the necessity of timing their investments in the proper
sectors to optimize growth along a critical path. 3y allowing
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investment to proceed either too rapidly or too slowly,
distortion and inefficiency are injected into the development
process. [Ref. 100]
By almost any measure, the classic example of the oil
syndrome and its consequences can be found in present-day
Nigeria. Arising in the mid-1970' s, the oil syndrome af-
fliction is a relatively recent phenomenon. The only nations
in West Africa who were established as major oil exporters
early enough to develop most of the symptoms are Nigeria and
Gabon. Nigeria's pre-oil economy was one of Africa's most
robust, with real GDP growing at an annual rate of 4.5 percent.
Agriculture was the leading economic sector, as Nigeria was
one of the world's largest exporters of peanuts, palm oil,
and cocoa. Nigeria's manufacturing sector had grown from
one percent of GDP in 1950, to five percent in 1964. Over
the same period, expansion of the money supply averaged about
four percent and the rate of inflation about one oercent. In
short, Nigeria's economic prospects, at the time looked bright,
especially when compared to other black African nations.
[Ref. 101: p. 1]
Following the 19 6 7-1969 civil v/ar, which decimated
Nigeria's manufacturing and agriculture sectors, oil income
shot up dramatically, from $139 million in 1964 to almost
$24 billion in 1931. [Ref. 98: p. 317; 101: p. 1] The
rapid influx of foreign exchange had immediate and disastrous
effects on the Nigerian economy. First, in order to spread
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more of the new wealth to urban workers, Nigeria's central
bank kept the exchange rate of the domestic currency (naira)
unrealistically high; and the policy of massive public
spending, tempered only by the government's physical ability
to organize the handing out of contracts, unleashed a self-
perpetuating cycle of hyper-inflation. Consequently, foreign
goods became steadily less expensive in naira (N) terms
compared to domestic goods, spoiling the markets for domestic
producers, driving savings out of the country, and increasing
the incentive for smuggling. [Ref. 103: p. 5; 104: pp. 35-39]
In this respect, oil allowed Nigeria to multiply its exports
in dollar terms by ten times in ten years, and its imports
by eleven times. [Ref. 105: p. 3]
While oil earnings were rising to claim over 90 percent
of Nigeria's total foreign exchange, agriculture and manu-
facturing shrank from 53 percent of total GDP in 1964 to 20
percent in 1980. [Ref. 21: p. 35] Nigeria, which was once
the region's largest food exporter, now has one of the most
staggering food production problems in V7est Africa. Following
the sharp increase in government spending in the early 19 70s,
thousands abandoned farming for higher paying jobs in the
cities, and Nigeria plunged from food self-sufficiency to a
nation dependent upon over $2.2 billion in annual imports of
rice, frozen chickens, and other foods. [Ref. 106: p. 7; 10 7;
p. 8] In the same vein, the migration of rural workers to
urban centers in Gabon has reached such oroportions that the
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country now imports bananas from its neighbors, even though
bananas grow abundantly in the wild. [Ref. 21: p. 85] All
of the programs initiated by the Nigerian government to
stimulate agriculture have failed because the prices offered
to Nigerian farmers have been significantly less than it cost
them to produce their crops and less than they could make by
working in town. Consequently, the range of products which
Nigeria can sell abroad has been narrowed to one: oil.
Instead of greater economic independence, built on a
bonanza of petroleum receipts, President Shagari faces the
dilema that Nigeria is less self-reliant today than when it
became independent 22 years ago. [Ref. 108: p. 1] By publicly
placing so much emphasis on its oil wealth and by seeking to
use that wealth to satisfy the rising level of demands
emanating from their country's deeply divided regional and
ethnic groups, the actions of Nigeria's political leaders have
exacerbated the problems associated with the oil syndrome.
So far Nigeria has avoided the final step of that syndrome.
Unlike Mexico, Nigeria has not yet begun to mortgage its
future by using its oil reserves as collateral for large-
scale international borrowing to finance growing government
expenditures. However, future Nigerian leaders may find this
a difficult trap to avoid as societal demands continue to
escalate.
One oil producing West African country which apparently
has recognized this problem is Cameroon. Using Nigeria and
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Gabon as negative models, the Caneroonian government has
decreed that a minimum of publicity shall be given to its
oil industry. Vlhen there is an oil discovery, that is all
the government announces; nothing is said about the size,
type, or location of the strike. In addition, a large portion
of Cameroon's oil earnings are held in overseas government
bank accounts to avoid overheating the economy. The objective
of this approach is to prevent an exodus of farm workers from
the agricultural sectors and to keep a truly diversified
economy. [Ref. 15: p. 54]
It would be an illusion to maintain that Cameroon doesn't
have some major economic problems, but relative to most other
oil exporters, so far its development scheme is attaining
desired results. Cameroon's economy has been growing at a
real rate of 6 percent, its currency reserves rose from $52
million in 1978 to $194 million in 19 80, the budget increased
by 26 percent in 19 81, and 19 80 was the first time that cocoa
and coffee each earned less individually than did crude oil
exports. [Ref. 19: p. 26; 109: p. 8] Cameroon's policies
have kept the migration of workers to urban areas to a
relative minimum, and by keeping market incentives high for
its farmers, Cameroon has maintained its status as a food
exporter.
Besides Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, the Congo, and
possibly Gabon, have a chance to succeed in spite of their




most mature outlook toward the windfall of oil revenues,
nonetheless, the leaders of both countries will be severely
tested to funnel their oil revenues into productive invest-
ments, and to avoid the temptations of political expediency.
In the world history of petroleum development, only America
has avoided the pitfalls of the oil syndrome. [Ref. 10 7: p. 4]
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VII. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF OIL
l^ile development is undoubtedly the preeminent concern
of the West African oil exporting countries, it is not the
only worry of the African people; they are also concerned
about threats to their security due to internal instability
and external adventurism — and oil based economic development
has not necessarily led to either domestic or regional poli-
tical stability. Very few West African states have been free
of threats; for some there have been continued internal or
border struggles for decades. The various sources of such
instability are as old as the African people themselves, often
having roots in long-standing ethnic rivalries or in border
disputes arising from unclear and arbitrary colonial agreements
that failed to recognize traditional tribal or familial land
rights -- all have been exacerbated by the discovery of oil.
Only Zaire, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, among current West
African oil producers, have not experienced oil induced poli-
tical instability or interstate conflict.
A. DOMESTIC
The discovery of oil accompanied by large influxes of
foreign exchange, even if properly managed, can produce
economic shocks of a magnitude capable of distorting both a
country's economy and its social fabric. The first symptom
of approaching danger that politicians must address is a
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sudden rise in expectations and a desire by the poor for the
"good life" now. Failure to satisfy these expectations and
to devise a politically acceptable method for distributing
the wealth can unleash a host of destabalizing evils, in-
cluding general domestic unrest, resurgence of ethnic
rivalries and sectoral feuds, increased graft, corruption
and crime, and possibly overthrow of the government.
This list is by no means exhaustive, but each example
cited can claim a current or recent case in West African
history. For instance, Cameroon has experienced recent
domestic unrest from widely varied segments of its population,
which have included: strikes by students over increases in
their university stipends, nation-wide discontent over
increasing school fees and the rate of inflation, and ethnic/
sectoral rivalry in the form of demands by Cameroon's Anglo-
phone district for more political autonomy and a greater
share of the oil money. [Ref. 110: p. 5] Both the Biafra
and Cabinda secessionist movements had strong oil and ethnic
motives behind them. [Ref. Ill: p. 6] Gabon had to invoke
stern anti-graft and corruption measures to counter a growing
crime wave; while the greatest threat to Nigeria's security
is seen as coming from a general breakdown of law and order.
[Ref. 10 5: p. 12] Finally, by allowing the gap between the
rich and the poor to become excessive, every oil exporting
country runs the risk of a Lt. Rawlings style "puritanical
revolution. " In sum, the near- term implications for domestic
128

tranquility in West Africa's oil exporting countries does
not look favorable.
B. REGIONAL
The advent of West African oil production has also had
an impact on the stability of the region's interstate
relations. West African politicians and academics alike have
conjectured that petroleum development would have a beneficial
effect on regional stability, because it would motivate the
oil exporting countries to protect their material prosperity
by developing effective military establishments to defend
their borders, and by promoting diplomatic and economic co-
operation to reduce the overall potential of threat. Although
this argument is plausible, history has not been kind to it.
In the first place, the oil exporters who have tried to develop
effective military organizations have done so in the same
manner that they have used to develop their other infra-
structural components — they have tried to buy development,
and as a result, there are some incredibly expensive and
ineffective military establishments in West Africa, some of
which cannot even project a sustainable force to their own
borders. [Ref. 112: p. 10]
At any given time, it is not unusual to find 15 -co 20
wars, border clashes, and/or guerrilla conflicts raging in
Africa, and the West Africans have not been reluctant to
engage in their fair share of the continent's imbroglios.
.29

The discovery of oil, which has sensitized every country in
the region to the potential of an oil "El Dorado" in their
backyard, has heightened tensions along fuzzy borders, impre-
cisely demarcated by former colonial rulers; and today there
are a number of potentially dangerous oil-fueled territorial
disputes brewing in West Africa.
In the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial
Guinea, and Gabon are the closest of neighbors, but the
territorial scramble for oil resources has caused them to
drop all pretenses of being good neighbors. Nigeria and
Cameroon are embroiled in a six-year dispute over the oil
rich, swampy Rio del Ray region, where Cameroonian gendarmes
killed five Nigerian soldiers during a night riverine patrol
on 16 May 1981. Although Cameroon's President Ahidjo has
decided to pay compensation to the families of the Nigerian
victims, agreement on the precise location of the old German-
British border has not been reached. [Ref. 113: p. 3] The
situation was made more explosive in July by Nigerian accu-
sations that Cameroon was extracting oil from the Nigerian
side of the Lake Chad Basin. [Ref. 114: p. 1735]
To make things more interesting. Equatorial Guinea began
prospecting for oil in the same general area in 19 81 and
immediately became involved in a dispute with Gabon over the
rights to a potential petroleum area off the island of
Corisco. I"7hile that dispute, also involving Spain and France,
v;as being negotiated, Hispanoil, in a joint venture with
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Equatorial Guinea, began drilling in the vicinity of the
Nigerian and Cameroonian oil fields off Biko Island. Borders
in the area have never been formally agreed upon and the
situation is ripe for a three-way conflict. [Ref. 59: p. 149;
111: p. 7]
Further north, along the Atlantic seaboard, three countries
are jostling each other over the ownership of offshore areas
with oil potential. Senegal and Guinea-Bissau are arguing
over the rights to the Flor Dome oil deposit. The dispute
stems from an agreement between France and Portugal, during
the colonial period, which placed a portion of Guinea-Bissau's
territorial waters under the administrative control of Senegal.
Since neither France nor Portugal ever ratified the agreement,
Guinea-Bissau has attempted to reassert its sovereignty over
the area; Senegal, on the other hand, claims the territory
was ceded to them, and the dispute remains unresolved. To
the south, Guinea-Bissau is contesting an offshore territorial
claim by Guinea. When colonialism came to an end it was
generally agreed that the frontiers of African coastal states
would extend seaward at roughly right angles to the coastal
baseline; however, Guinea's Sekou Toure thinks otherwise, and
he has laid claim to a large wedge of Guinea-Bissau's offshore
area. Guinea-Bissau has hotly denied Toure ' s claims; so far
no physical blows have been struck. As a result of their
colonial heritage, Senegal, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau have
limited their petroleum exploration efforts to non-contested
zones. [Ref. 115: p. 1]
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The concepts of national dignity, economic independence,
and state sovereignty are shared by every West African
petroleum exporting country, and expectations of their
realization have been magnified by the development of petroleum.
This is evident not only in economic development, food pro-
duction, and petroleum export issues, but also in such
concerns as domestic and regional security issues. However,
if the historical patterns discussed above remain consistent,
most of these countries will sooner or later face the Nigerian
dilemma of increasing dependence rather than growing independence,
Their wealth will increase as exports of petroleum rise, but
so will their dependence upon Western markets for petroleum,
and upon the developed nations for their technical know-how,
equipment, and capital. In short, politically, as well as
economically, rising oil production will almost certainly
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